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The present time is a watershed period in the history of the AID-University relations.
AID  is  reorganizing  and  redirecting  its  foreign  assistance  efforts,  and  if  preliminary
indications predict the final character  of AID, the traditional role of the universities in the
future plans of the Agency will continue to be dramatically reduced.  The need for university
technical  expertise,  particularly  in agriculture,  has  not  diminished,  nor  has  the quality  of
university  expertise.  Why  then does  the  AID-University program  seem to be  headed  for
ruin?
In fact,  the  diminishing  concern  within the Agency  for  technical  assistance  is  not
unique.  With each reorganization, beginning with the formation of the Foreign Operations
Administration  under  Harold  Stassen in  1954,  the  Agency  has  lost  some  of its  technical
expertise  and  its  concern  for  technology-based  development  strategies.  The  universities
possess  the  expertise  to  fill  this  need  within  the  Agency,  but  without  an  effective
collaboration  between AID  and the universities, this  expertise  has not been  fully tapped.
OBJECTIVES
The objective  of our study is to provide  a historical perspective  which is  needed  to
understand  the forces that have  molded the AID-University partnership:  those which have
aided its success and those which at times have threatened its continuation.  It examines the
web  of relationships  that each  organization  has with  their respective  constituency  groups,
with Congress,  the administration,  and the foreign governments  and universities.  It studies
the motivations  of each  of these organizations,  their systems of accountability,  their goals
and their values, and it presents  the deficiencies  and accomplishments  of the program.
METHODOLOGY
The paper is structured historically and concludes with an analysis of recurring issues
that have plagued the relationship throughout its forty-year  history and a look to the future
of  the Agency-University  program.  Popular  newsprint,  scholarly  journals,  Congressional
testimony,  government  reports,  and  personal  interviews  were  all  used  to  highlight  the
significant  events  in  each  period.  Appendix  A  employs  game  theory  to  interpret  the
difficulty in establishing a productive relationship between the Agency and the Universities.
CONCLUSIONS
The  program  by  which  AID  engages  the  expertise  of  US  universities  has  great
potential.  The  transformation  of  US  agricultural  productivity,  led  by  the application  of
iiresearch  developed  in US universities,  as well as  the universities'  continuing contributions
to  understanding  both  domestic  and  international  issues  testifies  to  their  potential  as  a
resource  for  foreign  assistance.  The  Agency  has  developed  an  extensive  system  for
coordinating technical and non-technical  aid and also has great potential to coordinate work
with the universities.
The  crux  of  the  program's  inadequacies  lies  in  the  difficulty  in  establishing  a
cooperative  and  mutually beneficial  relationship.  This  difficulty, we  conclude,  is endemic
in the program.  It stems from the incongruity  of rewards  AID and the universities receive
from  the  program,  from  the  vastly  different  modes  of  operation  under  which  each
organization works,  and  from  the  lack  of support  from  Congress  and  the  administration.
These  three  factors  are  revealed  in  a  number  of attributes  of the  program.  They  are
discussed  briefly below.
Because  AID  is a political organization  subject to the  will of Congress  and heavily
lobbied by special interest groups, it has been difficult to build a clear mandate and a solid
foundation  for  its  work.  It  is  forced  to react  to  the  development  fads  of  any particular
period.  As  a  foreign assistance  agency,  it must  continually justify  its existence  whenever
budgetary  constraints  bring  into question  appropriations  for  "non-essential"  expenditures.
It  has been used  as  a  tool  for broader,  but not  necessarily  consistent, goals.  And  it  has
suffered  from  high  rates  of personnel  turnover.  Consequently,  it  has  not  been  able  to
establish a strong organizational  identity that could allow it to engage in long-term contracts
with other organizations,  such  as  the universities.
The  Universities  have  also  contributed  to  the  decline  of  the program.  Because
participation in overseas work often limits the ability of their faculty to publish or to achieve
tenure,  aspiring  analysts  are  given  little  incentive  to  participate  in  AID  programs.
Universities  administrations  are  more  geared  to  managing  long-term  projects  and  have
frustrated  AID  by  their  poor  contract  management.  Universities  have  often  failed  to
integrate  international work into  their  institutional  mission.  Moreover,  many universities
have secured  projects for which  they have little expertise.  These factors  have  caused AID
to be disappointed  in the universities performance.
Both  organizations  can  benefit from  the program,  but neither  will benefit without
cooperation from the other.  Building a sense of trust, then, is essential to the success of the
program.  However,  the political pressures under which AID operates have not facilitated
the stability in the program,  and stability is a crucial element in building that trust.
If  Congress  and  the  administration  could  establish  a  proper  foundation  for  the
program so each organization could concentrate on utilizing its comparative advantage,  then
rewards  from  the  program  would  be  forthcoming  and  each  organization  would  gain
incentives  to continue to contribute  effective  work.
iiiEven  though  the University-AID  program  has not  lived up  to  its potential,  it has
achieved  very  significant  results.  In  recent  years,  the  program  which  has  been  most
successful  in  coordinating  university  technical  assistance  has  been  the  Collaborative
Research  Support Programs (CRSPs).
The CRSPs operate  under  a grant program which allows  for university  freedom in
project  design  and  management.  They  receive  strong  support  in  Congress  because  the
research benefits both international and domestic agricultural production.  As a result, long-
term projects  are  made  possible.  CRSPs  have  also  benefitted  from  a  unique  planning
procedure  by which  non-participating  but knowledgeable  analysts design and  evaluate  the
policy and implementation of the program.  While institution-building programs have fallen
out of favor  with AID, these collaborative  programs  are expected  to continue.
The  most  recent  meeting  of the  Board  for  International  Food  and  Agricultural
Development and Economic Cooperation (BIFADEC) confirmed the speculation based on
recent  Agency  reorganization  plans  that  AID  is  turning  away  from  cooperating  with
universities  in technical  assistance.  A report from a blue-ribbon  committee headed  by Dr.
G.  Edward  Schuh  which  called  for  a  radical  reorientation  of  the  Agency  toward
collaborative  agricultural  technical  assistance received  little encouragement.
Signs  of hope  for the  future  include  the  establishment  of a  Center for University
Cooperation  and Development  within  AID which will coordinate  university participation.
In  its present reorganization plan AID  has  called  for  the program  to extend  cooperation
with  a broader  array of colleges  and universities, especially  business schools.
The  future  of the  AID-University  program in  technical  assistance  is very  much  in
question.  Based upon the history enumerated in the paper, our analysis would conclude that
its success must be predicated  upon the  emergence  of greater trust between AID and  the
universities.  Because  the  two  organizations  work  very  differently,  the  program  should
maximize  the  relative  strengths  of  each  without  mutual  interference.  From  a  historical
perspective,  it  is  clear  that  sustaining  and  strengthening  the  AID-University  program
presents  a difficult challenge  for today's  leaders.
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ixCHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The premise  of the AID-University partnership in U.S. foreign assistance programs
is that universities are endowed with the technical skills that, if properly coordinated  by AID
and  transferred  by  the  partnership,  can  free  the  constraints  on  increased  agricultural
productivity  in developing  countries.  This is the ultimate  goal of the program.  However,
during  its forty-year  history the  program  has  been used  for various  other purposes  which
have  influenced  its development  and policies.
Initially,  the  program  was  primarily  a  tool  used  to  win good  will  for  the  United
States,  to develop overseas  markets for U.S.  investments,  and to strengthen the  developing
countries against the communist ideology.  During the 1960s, a stronger emphasis was given
to long-term development.  Following  the world food crisis of the early 1970s, the program
emphasized  humanitarian assistance  to nations that needed  to develop  the food-producing
capacity to feed their hungry populations.  In the  1980s, support  for the program  declined
as private  initiatives increasingly  usurped  university technical  assistance,  and political  and
strategic  goals  were  emphasized  over  humanitarian  goals.  The  current  support  for  the
program  is largely  a result  of momentum  built up in the past.
1The history and analysis of the agency-university program leads to the conclusion that
the program has suffered from Congressional actions and from the philosophies of different
political  administrations  which  together  have  not  allowed  the  Agency  for  International
Development  to become  an effective  organization  and have prohibited  the  establishment
of an effective  partnership with the universities.
Agency-Universitv  Partnership: The Beginning
University  participation  in  the  first  agency  programs  was  initiated  by  a  letter  to
President  Truman  from  John  A.  Hannah,  President  of  the  Association  of  Land  Grant
Colleges and Universities,  on February  4,  1949.  Dr. Hannah wrote  in part,
This is to offer the full cooperation of the members of the Association
of Land-Grant  Colleges  and  Universities  in carrying  out the  fourth point  of
your inaugural  address, which gave  new inspiration to many  of us who have
been convinced  that  such  a program  is  basic to progress  toward  the  stable,
democratic,  peaceful world which we  all want.
One  of  the  greatest  contributions  America  can  make  to  the
improvement of living standards, elimination of hunger, and fostering of peace
in certain parts of the world is by encouraging  education in food production,
food handling, food utilization, and better homemaking and family life among
rural and urban people.  These have been the objectives, the basic philosophy
and  the  outstanding  role  of  the  Land-Grant  Colleges  and  Universities  in
American life since  the passage  87 years  ago of basic legislation for federal-
state cooperation  in a national system of "people's colleges" dedicated to the
"education  of the industrial classes in the  several pursuits and professions of
life."  It is time this basic philosophy  and the "know-how" developed  in more
than fourscore years of operating under it is extended  to the rest of the world
on a  much broader scale  than has been  the case  in the past.  Your message
will furnish a powerful  impetus  in that direction.... 2
2The Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities' offer to President Truman
and to his goal of extending  U.S. technology to the developing countries posed a substantial
commitment  on  the  part  of the  U.S.  universities  to  an  undefined  program.  The  offer
recognized that the universities  had made an outstanding contribution  to the development
of the United  States  and its agricultural  productivity.  It explained the need  for technical
services  in the less developed  countries  and projected  the  potential  of the  universities  to
satisfy that need.
The Association was well aware of the potential costs the universities could incur by
offering their "full  cooperation."  Their letter states that "the  release  of staff members  on
leave for work  abroad or  consultation  in this  country would  handicap some institutions  in
carrying  out  their  domestic  responsibilities.  The  training  of  foreign  students  and
consultation with foreign visitors would involve  serious demands on crowded facilities  and
on  time  of  staff  members." 3 Despite  these  costs,  the  universities  have  fulfilled  that
commitment  of full  cooperation  for  much  of their  forty-year  partnership  with  the  U.S.
foreign assistance  agency.
Oddly  enough, in the past few years the universities'  lack of commitment has been
the subject of complaints by the agency.  It is this lack of university commitment, according
to the agency, which explains the deteriorating relations between the two organizations.  In
contrast, some in the university  have regarded their involvement in foreign assistance as the
fourth pillar of the land-grant  educational  system,  after teaching,  research  and  extension.
3By  the same  token  the universities  have  felt an ever-decreasing  support within  the  agency
for technical assistance  work.  This decrease  is reflected in,  and is a product of,  the paucity
of agency personnel with  technical backgrounds.  Both organizations  have much to gain by
their partnership.  Why then has a potentially promising program  become one fraught with
continuing  difficulties?  To understand  this we  turn to  the beginnings  of the Point  Four
program.
The involvement of the United  States in foreign  assistance  is a phenomenon  unique
to its post-World War II history.  For much of its history, the United  States was committed
to the political ideal  of isolationism.  However,  as it  emerged  from the war as the leading
world power, the United States became more involved  in international  concerns and began
to  expand  its  sphere  of  influence  politically,  militarily  and  economically.  The  foreign
assistance  program was an important  new development  in U.S. foreign policy. It began first
with  the  successful  four-year  Marshall  Plan  which  aided  the  reconstruction  of western
Europe.  Having  completed  that,  the  United  States  turned  its  attention  to  assist  the
developing nations  of the world.
In his  1948  inaugural address  President  Truman  announced the  plan to  extend  the
technical knowledge of the United States to assist the development  of Third World nations.
A leading purpose of the new program was to strengthen our allies and to discourage  other
nations  from aligning with  the Communist  bloc.  This "Point Four" program  was to be  an
historic  new  turn  in  U.S.  relations  with  the  developing  nations,  and  the  beginning  of  a
4substantial  commitment  by  the  United  States.4 One  editorial  remarked:  "a  little
psychology,  a little  money,  a few devoted  experts,  and a very  good  idea --  these  were  the
ingredients  of Point Four." s
John Hannah, then president  of the Association  of Land-Grant Colleges,  explained
the value of university contributions to foreign assistance programs in his letter to President
Truman.  "The troubled  areas  of the world  are  primarily  agricultural,  and  their  political
problems derive primarily from the need to  develop a higher standard  of living--more  and
better food, and better clothing and housing for their people.  It is this problem  which the
United  States,  for all its  deficiencies,  has  solved  better than any other major nation.  It is
in the solution of this problem for other nations that we offer the services of the land-grant
institutions and their nationwide staffs and experience  in the fields of research, teaching, and
extension  work  in agriculture,  homemaking,  and  in the  technology  of improved  industrial
production."6
U.S.  universities  had  long  been  leaders  in  technical  advances,  particularly  in
agriculture.  Since the inception of the land-grant universities  under the Morril Acts of 1862
and  1880,  they  had  received  strong,  continuous  support  from  the  government  for  their
research,  teaching  and  extension  activities,  and  had  transformed  the  productivity  of
American  agriculture.
5The work of the universities in the Point Four program was to cover many disciplines,
but their primary involvement  was to assist developing countries to form a modern  system
of agriculture.  Projects  varied  widely  from place  to  place,  but  each  had  as  its  goal  the
development  of  research,  teaching  and  extension  for  the  generation  and  diffusion  of
agricultural  technology.  Though  it  had  originally  been  somewhat  naively  thought  that
agricultural production techniques proven successful in the United States would work in the
developing  countries  as  well,  it  was  soon  learned  that  the  vastly  different  agro-climatic
conditions and  the  differences  in  culture  and resources  would  necessitate  the  adaption  of
these techniques  to  the  new environment.  Building  the capacity  to adapt  and  to develop
technology has been the  stimulus to create  the institution-building programs.
This  involvement  of  U.S.  universities  in  foreign  assistance  was  a  unique  and
innovative  program.  Universities  had previously  engaged  in work  in  other  countries,  but
only on a limited  basis.  The Point Four program  institutionalized  the  involvement  of the
universities  within the agency.
Both the agency  and the universities had much to gain from their partnership.  The
agency gained the  technical  expertise  of the  universities  to assist in the  implementation  of
its foreign aid programs.  This technical  expertise would  become much broader  than what
could ever be employed within the agency.  The university faculty gained a broader field in
which to study, thus creating new challenges to solve and new technical frontiers to explore.
By  exposing  their  faculty  to  international  environments,  the  home  university  generally
6improved  the  quality of its  own instruction.  Though  both organizations  had much  to gain
in theory,  it  has been both  a highly productive  and highly frustrating  relationship.
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  to  understand  the  forces  which  have  molded  this
relationship:  those which have aided  its success  and those which at times have  threatened
its continuation.  It will  examine  the web  of relationships  that  each  organization  has with
their  respective  constituency  groups,  with  Congress,  the  administration,  and  the  foreign
governments and universities.  It will study their motivations, their systems of accountability,
their goals and their values, and it will present the deficiencies  and accomplishments  of the
program.  The paper will begin with the history of the program and its evolution over time,
followed by an analysis  of recurring  issues that have plagued  the relationship throughout its
forty-year history.  It concludes  with a look to the future of the agency-university  program.
Chapter  Two  analyzes  the  foundation  of  the  foreign  assistance  program  and  the
effects  of two prominent, but antithetical agency administrators  -- Harold Stassen and John
Hollister.  The period was characterized by the organizational  difficulties involved in taking
an idea and creating an institutional system to achieve its goals.  The competing goals of the
program, however, impeded the leaders from establishing both a firm foundation and a clear
direction  for the program  and the agency.
Chapter Three describes the relationship between the agency and the universities as
the program  became  well  established  and increasingly  effective  at  building  institutions  in
7developing  nations.  The period began with  another  major agency  reorganization  and  an
emphasis on capital  transfers as the primary vehicle  of development work.  The number of
projects increased  dramatically during this period and various studies assessed the goals and
methods of the program.
Chapter Four examines the disillusionment with previous forms of foreign assistance
that led Congressional  leaders  to direct foreign assistance toward the "poorest of the poor."
The  institution-building  model  of foreign  assistance  was  superseded  by  the collaborative
model.  In  1975,  the Congress put forth a major new commitment  to the agency-university
partnership by passing the Title XII amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  The
amendment  provided additional support for universities,  a type  of research  collaboration,
and a new voice within AID  for university concerns.
Chapter Five examines how AID, after extensive  investments in universities, became
less inclined  to utilize the universities for  technical  assistance.  Foreign  assistance  funding
during the period was often appropriated  to serve the strategic and military interests  of the
United  States, while  those  funds earmarked  to  development  were  increasingly  channeled
through private voluntary  organizations(PVOs).  As a  result of the  dwindling budget,  lack
of strong leadership,  and increasing  tensions between universities  and AID,  the number of
development projects  rapidly decreased.
8Chapter  Six  investigates  the  institutional  arrangements  of  the  agency-university
program  and their effect  on the partnership  over  the  course of its history.
Chapter Seven describes the new developments  in the agency-university  relationship.
The  program  is  presently  undergoing  dramatic  changes  that  will  influence  its  course  of
action  for  the  coming decade.  To  the  extent  possible,  these  changes  are  discussed  here.
Finally,  the  paper  ends  with  some  speculation  on  the  future  of  the  agency-university
program.
9CHAPTER TWO
University  Projects  1950-1960
POINT  FOUR  AND  THE  EARLY 
YEARS:  1950-1960
The  participation  of  the  U.S. 
universities  in  foreign  assistance  became  ..  ....
well  established  in  1954  during  the
formation  of the  Foreign  Operations  Administration  (FOA)  under the  administration  of
Harold Stassen.  Point Four had been an initiative  of the  Democrats and was  particularly
linked to the Truman administration.  Although a few university projects were begun before
1954, the majority of agency  projects were implemented  by the in-house technicians  of the
Mutual  Security  Administration  (MSA)  and  the  Technical  Cooperation  Administration
(TCA),  predecessors  to  the  FOA. 7 The  Eisenhower  administration  wanted  to  sever  the
program's  identification  with  the  Truman  administration,  and  to  encourage  private
initiatives.  The administration tried  to change  the name  of Point Four, but it was already
entrenched  throughout the world (one  official who measured  its worldwide  impact stated,
"it  has  caught  on  like  coca-cola!"). 8 Eventually,  the  Eisenhower  administration  would
revamp  both the organization  and mission of the  Point Four program.
10Universities  were  drawn  into  the  foreign  assistance  program  during  this
reorganization  to  provide  the technical  assistance  once given  by  agency technicians.  The
reorganization  had  its  roots  in  the  change  in  government  two years  earlier.  The  1952
election had brought both  a new Republican president and a new Republican  Congress  to
power.  Both were  less supportive  of foreign  assistance than their predecessors. 9 The new
Congress  directed several  committees to investigate  the foreign assistance  program.  This
committee  action produced the Mutual  Security Act  of 1953  which  ordered FOA director
Harold  Stassen  to  eliminate  25%  of  the  agency's  personnel  by  January  1,  1954.10  The
number of technical personnel in the agency was dramatically reduced in this reorganization.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles forecast the  reduction in  agency  technical  personnel
during the  Congressional hearings on that bill when he noted  that private sector initiatives
might  implement  U.S.  technical  assistance  as  well  as  or  better  than  government
assistance."  The agency has suffered  from the  lack of technical personnel  ever since  this
decision.  From the  university  perspective  the  lack  of technical  personnel  has  been the
major  cause  of  the  agency's  failure  to  understand  and  value  the  contribution  of  the
universities to U.S. foreign assistance.  It has therefore been a leading cause  of disharmony
in their relationship.
The Stassen  Era
On September  11,  1953, Harold Stassen, the Director of the MSA announced before
a meeting  of private philanthropic leaders  the plan to cut part of the Point Four technical
11assistance programs  and begin  using voluntary  agencies  and U.S. colleges  and universities
to  carry  out  technical  assistance.1 2 On  October  6, 1953,  he  presented  the  plan  to  the
annual meeting of the National Association of State Universities  and Land Grant Colleges,
which  then included  over  300  university  presidents.  The  technical  assistance  budget,  he
announced,  would  be  increased  by  20  - 30%  and  it  would  incorporate  more  fully  the
participation  of  the  universities. 3 At  a  meeting  of  the  leaders  of U.S.  aid  missions  in
Lima,  Peru  a few  months later,  Stassen  instructed  each  aid mission  to  suggest  by June  1,
1954 a university with which they could work to carry out the technical  assistance programs
in their region.
Under the Stassen administration, 20 new University projects were added.  This was
due in large  part to  the  power  and  charisma  of its  administrator,  Harold  Stassen.  This
growth was not achieved  by any sort of an evolutionary process but, rather,  by mandate.  In
other words,  each mission  was  directed  to choose  a university  with  which to  work,  not  so
much because an  individual  nation  or university was asking for this  type of assistance,  but
because  Stassen  decided  these  projects  were  needed,  perhaps  to  carry  out  Point  Four
programs with less cost and personnel.  His directive was not based on any type of feasibility
study, and it seemingly included  little consultation with the  agency's missions.  The agency
staff,  in response  to Stassen's  habit  of issuing  policy  directives  without  prior  consultation
with  them,  dubbed his policies  "SSS" (Stassen  Says  So).'4
12Stassen had a vision for expanding university  involvement, and he used his power to
put that vision into action.  He wanted programs that would be both responsive to the needs
of foreign countries and flexible  enough to pass through the "Washington bottlenecks."  By
expanding university participation he hoped to garner Congressional support for a long-term
commitment to  foreign aid and to increase  the quality  of personnel overseas.ls
Stassen's  power  stemmed  from  the  reorganization  of the  MSA  and  TCA  into  the
Foreign  Operations  Agency  (FOA),  as  well  as  the  broad  authority  granted  to  him  by
Congress to  remove  personnel.16 Eleven projects  were  begun during  Stassen's  18  month
tenure,  including  some  of the  major  university  programs  in  India,  Korea,  Thailand  and
Peru.l7  Because  of Stassen's  authority  to  implement  programs,  his  legacy  is  a period  of
prolific expansion of institution-building aid.  But his administration  also put a tremendous
strain  on the agency.
In truth, the Stassen era was both a bane and a blessing to university involvement in
foreign  aid.-  The  rapid  expansion  of  university  projects  helped  to  institutionalize  this
important  program  by  creating  a  "critical  mass"  of such  projects.  At  the  same  time,  the
rapid growth and Stassen's leadership  style "created a legacy of hostility in the agency toward
university  participation  and  led to  a  substantial  increase  in  negative  incidents  following
Stassen's  departure."  Stassen also  changed  the direction of the foreign  aid program.
13A presidential  advisory board warned Stassen that "lumping our Point Four program
with  military  or  economic  programs  abroad  would  amount  to  a 'major  mistake.' " 9 '  The
smaller TCA would be engulfed in the larger MSA changing the character of the program
and  reducing broad popular  support  for Point Four.  Other nations  would  read  into this
change new evidence of U.S. imperialistic tendencies.  The administration used a speech by
European Point Four Director Walter M. Ringer at the Women's National Republican Club
to deny the charge that technical  assistance was being tied to military assistance.  Whether
military and technical assistance were tied to one another is a debatable issue.  Clearly these
two forms  of technical  assistance were not separable,  more and  more technical  assistance
combined  with  military  assistance  and  targeted  to  the  nations  on  the  outer  fringe  of the
communist  bloc.  The  universities  were  presented  with  the  dilemma  of  whether  to
participate  in  assistance  whose  objectives  were  more  strategic  and  political  than
humanitarian or  educational.
The  creation  of  the  FOA  caused  a  significant  change  in  the  objectives  of  the
assistance  program.  It also  changed the  perception of the  program (by people  other than
policy makers) from one containing a modicum of altruism and goodwill to one concentrated
upon strategic interests.  From its inception, Point Four was included  in U.S. foreign policy
primarily  as a tool to contain  communism.  Humanitarianism  and economic  growth were
important, but they were secondary  goals.  Among policy makers this distinction was clearly
understood.  However, the anti-communist bias was not well translated to the general public,
the agency technicians,  or the recipients  of U.S. aid.  The rhetoric used to garner support
14for  Point Four highlighted  the  program's  benefit  to  the  poor.  Consequently,  among  the
general public  and the agency  technicians  working in  the field,  Point Four was commonly
perceived as the humanitarian response of the U.S. government to the suffering and material
deprivation  of Third World  Nations.
The  published  position  of  the  National  Education  Association  stated  "the  clear
purpose  of  the program  should  be  to  assist  the  people  of each  participating  country  to
improve  their condition:  to raise  their standard  of living,  to  make their lives, individually
and collectively,  more abundant and secure,  to enhance their dignity and sense of worth as
human beings."20 The program  was quite successful.  It was  implemented  with enthusiasm
approaching a missionary's zeal.  Policy makers saw in Point Four a program that would not
only be  in the  self-interest  of the  United  States,  but would  appeal  to  the  basic  American
sense  of wanting to be  a compassionate  nation.  The humanitarian  perception  provided  a
strong motivation  for people engaged  in the program.
The  perception  was  changed  when  Stassen  merged  the  two  technical  assistance
agencies (TCA and MSA) into the Foreign Operations Administration.  PVOs were brought
into  the program  to provide  technical  assistance  and  the  FOA concentrated  on  security
assistance.  Now,  in  both  substance  and  perception,  the  program  clearly  focused  on  the
primary goal of containing  communism.
15In  1951,  The  New  York  Times  had  declared  the  Point  Four  program  to  be  "in
purpose"
a systematic attack  on the vicious  circle  that keeps  two-thirds of the world's
population too poor, too enfeebled, and too backward  to produce adequately,
and  too  unproductive  to  overcome  without  help  the  poverty, sickness,  and
ignorance  that hold them down.  To these people the crude propaganda  and
drastic techniques  of the  communists  must come with  the shock  of religious
revelation.2
Just over  two years later, when the TCA  had been  swallowed  up by the  FOA, The
New  York Times  declared that Point Four  had become  "an instrument  of America's 'cold
war'  policy."22
The formation  of the FOA also  marked  a significant change  in the program's  basic
philosophy under Eisenhower.  In essence  two methods of achieving the goal of containing
communism with foreign  aid  were  advocated.
The  first, espoused  by the  Democrats,  was to use  the  program  to  target the basic
needs of people and thereby to disarm the tempting communist propaganda  that promised
improved standards of living for the lower classes.  In  1949, Acting Secretary of State James
Webb testified  before  Congress  that  the U.S.  foreign policy  goals for  Point Four were  to
establish  conditions in the world  that permit the U.S. and others "to enjoy security against
external  aggression, to  preserve  and strengthen the concept of the dignity and freedom  of
the  individual,  and  to participate  in  a prosperous  and expanding  world  economy." 23 The
16head  of  the  TCA,  Stanley  Andrews,  succinctly  commented  that  "we  are  not  fighting
Communism, we are  fighting the  conditions which  cause  communism."24
The  Eisenhower  Administration  initiated  a  philosophy  supported  by  Republicans
which used the program to expand the U.S. political influence in the world.  Assistance was
a way to enlist the loyalty of foreign governments.  Republicans  who opposed  the original
concept  of  Point  Four  had  denounced  it  as  a  "world-wide  WPA."25 One  particularly
colorful condemnation  was provided  by Dr. Elgin Groseclose.
Overlooking the phenomenon that the hotbeds of communism in the East are
the  universities  among  the  relatively  well-fed  and  -clothed  students,  it
proceeds  on  the  hypothesis  that  communism breeds  on hunger  and  poverty
and  that the  antidote  to  such  are  things  as DDT,  artificial  insemination  of
cattle, steel plow points  and bigger jackasses. 26
Under Eisenhower, technical assistance was given primarily to countries on the fringe
of communist countries.  It was held out as an enticement to discourage  these governments
from turning to the Soviet Union.
The Hollister  Era
Foreign  aid programs  were  again  reorganized  in  1955  to become  the  International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) which  was headed  by John B. Hollister.27 Hollister had
little  knowledge  of or  interest  in  technical  assistance  programs.  He  had  been  executive
director  of  the  Hoover  Commission  which  studied  the  foreign  assistance  program  and
determined  "that 'mistakes  and waste' had characterized  the U.S. foreign aid program and
17that  'important  savings'  could  be  made  through  more  efficient  administration."28 In
contrast to the  growth  of university  projects  during  the Stassen  administration,  Hollister's
administration  intensely  challenged  any  plan  to  add  or  continue  projects. 29 Whereas
Stassen  is considered  to  be  a visionary leader  actively  demanding university  involvement,
Hollister  was  a  conservative  manager  who  wanted  to  streamline  the  entire  foreign  aid
program, including  university  involvement.  His administration  eventually  terminated  five
projects  (two  in  Jordan,  two  in  Chile,  and  one  in  Ecuador)  and  began  only  three  (in
Indonesia,  Japan, and  Guatemala).30
In  Hollister's  conception  of  foreign  assistance,  expenditures  for  personnel  were
overhead  rather  than  programmatic  costs.  In  his  concern  with  efficiency  he worked  to
reduce  overhead.  He  believed  that  foreign  assistance  could  be  made  more  efficient  by
supplying  the capital  to finance  development projects rather than by transferring personnel
to  improve  human  resources.  However,  people  were  the  core  of the  university  contract
program.  University faculty members were the means  by which  institutions  were built  and
productive  capability was improved.  The  Hollister era clearly was a low point in relations
between  the  agency  and  the  universities.  Long-term  agency staff  members  refer to that
period as the "Dark  Ages."31
Hollister's administrative  philosophy is reflected  in his policy directive which  stated
that  new  project  goals  needed  to  be  quantifiable,  that  detailed  documentation  was  a
prerequisite  for the consideration  of any proposal,  and  that a detailed  review process was
18required  before  submitting  a  proposal  to  the  director.32 Since  the  achievements  of
university projects were difficult to measure, Hollister's new administrative  policies worked
against  university  contract  programs.  In  contrast  to  Stassen,  Hollister  was  building
Washington bottlenecks.
There is also evidence  that Hollister  had little direct  interest in or knowledge  of the
university  program.  In  1955,  during  the  Conference  on  University  Contracts  Abroad,
Michigan State  University President John Hannah  noted
...[the need to] investigate  objectively with Mr. Dulles,  Mr. Hollister, and the
White House, if necessary, to determine what their feelings are... I don't know
Mr.  Hollister, but I haven't seen anything he has said or written that indicates
he has any awareness  at all  of this university  program.33
Tensions  between  the  agency  and  the  universities  increased  to  the  point that  the
American  Association of Land-Grant  Colleges  and  Universities  pledged  to bring  its case
before President Eisenhower.  It warned the agency of the possibility that many universities
might withdraw their participation in the program because  of "the lack of major concern for
and support  of institutions at the top ICA administrative  levels"  34  Tensions were diffused
only when Hollister personally addressed  the meeting of the association.  Thus, the agency-
university  partnership  avoided further fracturing.
The universities gained some political  clout during this period.  The Conference on
University  Contracts  Abroad  was  convened  by  the  American  Council  of  Education's
Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad (CIPA), which became a major representative
19for the universities.  The conference  resolution stated, "the principle governing relationship
between the government  and the  universities  in this program  must be  one  of cooperative
partnership  rather than that  of employer-employee." 35 Also  discussed  at  the  conference
were the problem of contracts  and the  need  for a  clear public policy statement  to enable
long-range  planning.  Perhaps the most significant  development  of CIPA was the initiation
of negotiations  that  led  to  the  adoption  of the  first  standard  university  contract.  A new
Office  of Contract Relations was  established  to centralize  contracting;  previously  a  dozen
divisions could  negotiate,  enter into, and administer contracts.36
Contracts  define  the  relationship  between  the  agency  and  the  universities  at  the
project level.  They had to be written generally enough to sit within the broad foreign policy
goals  of the United  States, and yet specific enough  to  give direction to the project.  They
had to be both challenging to encourage new work and realistic enough to fit each situation.
Contracts  had been a continual sore spot between  the two organizations,  and, although the
standard contracting did not end the disputes, it did signal an improvement  in relations.  In
fact,  it  is  considered  the  first  major  agency  policy  change  brought  about  by  university
initiative.37
Hollister and Stassen were antithetical  in their direction of the agency.  Stassen was
a  visionary,  action-oriented  leader  who  was  highly supportive  of  the  university  contract
program.  He wanted absolute control of the program.  As long the program was productive,
the  process  was  of little  concern  to  him.  Hollister, however,  was  more  concerned  with
20efficiency and proper management.  Because the university program involved high personnel
costs, Hollister believed it was not an efficient means of providing foreign aid and therefore
he did not actively support  the program.
While some  outstanding  work was  being completed  in  the field,  the administration
in Washington  was  not  developing  a strong  foundation which  could  support  future  work,
primarily  because  the  agency  lacked  a  clear  direction.  John  Richardson  in  Partners  in
Development  describes  this  period  in  the  agencies'  history  as  somewhat  akin  to  the
adolescent period of human growth.3  Following a rapid growth  spurt, the agency was out
of balance and needed  organization.  It was not until  the administration of David  Bell that
the agency "matured."
21CHAPTER THREE
University  Projects  1961-1972
THE  GROWTH  OF  INSTITUTION-
BUILDING  PROJECTS  AND  THE  '
AGENCY-UNIVERSITY  HARMONY: 
1961-1972 
Through  time,  the  techca  assistance  experiences  in  the  traditional  societies
Through time, the technical assistance experiences in the traditional societies
led  to  the  conclusion  that  success  in  modernization  involves  one  highly
important  and  necessary,  if not  sufficient,  condition.  This  condition  is  the
creation  of  change  in  old  institutional  infrastructure  or the  building  of new
institutions.  It  was  the  gradual,  somewhat  grudging  and  still  incomplete
recognition  of  the  fundamental  truth  that  led  the  United  States  into  the
institution-building business in the  developing  nations. 39
The early  1960s  brought  change  to  the  United  States'  foreign policy  and  relations
with  communist  nations.  Communist  Russia  had  developed  nuclear  weapons,  launched
Sputnik, and were extending their sphere of influence  throughout Africa and into one of the
United  States'  closest  neighbors,  Cuba.  To  counteract  the  perceived  threat,  the  United
22States formalized its response to communism through the foreign aid program.  It was at this
time  that the Peace  Corps  and the Alliance  for Progress  were  established.4 0
For universities,  this period was one of rapid growth in institution-building projects.
By the early 1960s  it had become widely understood  that simply transferring to developing
countries the new agricultural  techniques  developed  in America would  not be sufficient to
sustain  long-term  agricultural  development.  Certain techniques  developed  for  American
conditions and constraints were unsuitable  to the conditions of the less developed countries
(LDCs).  The best way for the United States to serve the LDCs was to build institutions that
could develop  indigenous  agricultural  technology  --  transferring  not only the suitable  U.S.
agricultural techniques  but also  the capacity  to develop  their own  techniques.
The  increased  emphasis  on  institution-building  and  the  many  years  of  technical
assistance  prompted  a  wide  range  of  studies  and  reflections  on  the  previous
accomplishments  and on  prospects  for the  future of AID-university  collaboration.  These
studies  focused  on the  institutional  relationships  between  AID and  the  universities.  This
relationship  went  through  a  tremendous  change  with  the reorganization  of the  agency  in
1961.
The Agency  Reorganization
23The  agency  underwent  its  fourth  major  reorganization  to become  the  Agency  for
International Development  (AID) in early 1961.  Under the new Foreign Assistance Act of
1961  the Development  Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Administration were
consolidated  as AID,  and the Latin America bureau of the ICA was given greater visibility
and  renamed  the Alliance  for  Progress.  The broader  goals  of the  Act  were  to initiate
"greater emphasis  on overall  long-term  development  of recipient  countries,  establishment
of standards  of self-help,  and  comprehensive  long-term  planning."4'  The change  created
in AID an administration which was more decentralized  and much less technically oriented.
"The new doctrine  held that underdevelopment  was caused  almost entirely  by interactions
among poor LDC economic  planning,  poor macro-economic  policy,  and shortage  of hard
currency foreign exchange  to pay for capital imports." 4 2 As opposed  to organizing  bureaus
according  to technical  expertise,  each  bureau  was  given  a  certain  geographical  region in
which  to  guide  all aspects  of foreign  aid work.  Each  bureau  was  equipped  with  a small
technical  staff  in  addition  to  administrators.  The  change  greatly  reduced  the  role  of
technical  services within AID, and  many technical  personnel  lost their positions.
The  reorganization  increased  the  agency's  need  for university  technical  experts  to
replace  in-house  agency  technicians,  but  it  actually  impeded  the  agency-university
relationship.  The agency  technical personnel  who lost  their jobs in the reorganization  had
been  the  primary  contact people  for  the universities.  Moreover,  the reduction  in  agency
technical personnel  left fewer people who could understand  the need for technical  services,
so agency  priorities  continued  to  turn  away  from  technical  assistance.  Consequently,  the
24reorganization  caused  universities  to  be  concerned  that  their future  involvement  in  AID
projects  might  diminish.43 John  Gardner,  president  of the  Carnegie  Corporation  of New
York, in his book  A.I.D. and the Universities44 noted  that if technical  assistance was to be
effective the agency needed to have personnel who could interact with University personnel
on an equal professional  level.  But with the new organizational  structure, this did not exist.
The reorganization  also blurred the focus and changed the overall plan of the agency.
Previously,  the  agency  had  been  structured  to  transfer  technology  that would  assist  the
development  of nations that were  needy or that could benefit  U.S. security interests.  The
foreign assistance goals and the means by which these goals were to be accomplished  were
fairly clear.  But the reorganization made the agency more of a comprehensive development
agency  integrating  many  diverse  vehicles  for  foreign  assistance,  especially  loans,  to  help
LDCs grow.  The  agency  therefore  became  less  of a technology-transferring  agency.45 It
had become  evident that U.S. technology was not always directly appropriate  or feasible in
vastly  different  environments.  Therefore,  to  facilitate  LDC  development,  a  more
broad-based  approach and  a more broadly defined  organization  was designed.
Newly-elected President John F. Kennedy appointed Fowler Hamilton to administer
the new Agency  for International  Development (AID).  Hamilton was primarily concerned
with  capital  transfers  from  the  United  States  to  the  LDCs  as  opposed  to  educational
assistance,  so  agency-university  relations  continued  on  a  holding  pattern.4 6 Hamilton's
effect on AID-university relations was minimal during a short fifteen-month administration.
25At  this  point  in  its  history,  AID  needed  to  regain  some  stability  and  direction.  The
reorganization  and  the  abundance  of  short-term  administrators  caused  confusion  which
limited the  effectiveness  of the  agency.
The Bell  Era
The  Administration  of  David  Bell  (1962-66)  was  a  turn toward  a  more  mutually
respectful  and fruitful relationship  between  the agency  and the universities.  As he  began
his tenure, the agency was in disarray from its reorganization  and public confidence  in it was
very low.  Shortly after Bell's  appointment President  Kennedy wrote  Bell to say with  a bit
of irony "I'm sure that my troubles with AID are over,  and  I hope that yours never begin."4 7
Given the state of AID when Bell became  administrator,  his work was amazingly  effective.
Twenty-six  university  contracts  were  established  many  of which  would  become  long-term
projects,  while  only 5 contracts  were  terminated.48 Perhaps  his  greatest contribution  was
to provide  stability within AID and to create  a sense  of cooperation  between AID and the
universities.
Although  many factors  led to improved relations between AID and the universities,
the key was  clearly  the stability  and direction Bell provided  for the future.  His  valuable
experience  prior to joining AID enabled  Bell to be not only an effective  administrator  but
also an empathetic leader.  Just before coming to AID he had been Kennedy's Director of
the Bureau of the Budget.  More important, Bell had been a professor at Harvard  and was
26the first AID administrator with  overseas experience.  He had served as a technical  adviser
in  Pakistan  with  the  Ford  Foundation.4 9 One  of  the  difficulties  with  any  foreign  aid
program,  and  specifically  with  the  agency-university  program  is  that the work  crosses  so
many cultures  and  modes  of operation.  Bell was  uniquely  qualified  to head  the agency,
having worked  in all  three major  fields:  government,  universities  and overseas  technical
assistance.
Bell's leadership style facilitated  the development of the agency as an institution.  In
contrast to the impetuous  demands  of Stassen, Bell was  much more measured;  and unlike
Hollister he strongly  supported  technical  assistance.  Policies  were  carefully  planned  and
agency workers  were well  aware  of the  reasoning  behind  each  decision.  This  fostered  a
sense of teamwork in which  the agency workers  and their partners in the universities were
working together for a common goal.  In contrast to Hollister,  Bell supported growth in aid
programs,  particularly in the university programs.  The agency nearly doubled its contracts
during his three-year administration.  Under Bell, university participation  in AID programs
was clearly welcomed  and valued.
Agency-university  participation  in technical  assistance  had grown through  ten years
of innovation and change.  The stability of Bell's administration enabled the agency and the
universities  to more formally  evaluate  the accomplishments  and  difficulties  of their work,
and  plan  for  the  work  ahead.  Many  of  the  early  successes  of  the  program  could  be
attributed to individual initiative.  The need, then, was to design an institutional system that
27could  support future  technical  assistance.  Just  as the  focus  of technical  assistance  turned
toward  institution-building,  so  the  agency  and  the  universities  needed  to  develop  new
institutional schemes  for their work.  A number of conferences were convened  and reports
written to study agency-university  collaboration.  The first and perhaps the most influential
of these was the Gardner Report, published jointly in 1964 by the agency and by Education
and World Affairs, a university  organization  involved in  international development  issues.
The report was written by John Gardner who was highly respected in both governmental and
academic circles.
The commissioning  of the report provided  the  agency  with  some needed  direction
and  was  a  significant  step  in  improving  relations  between  AID  and  the  universities.
Although  AID  commissioned  many  studies,  few have  had the  impact  of Gardner  Report.
Richardson  attributed  its impact  to  the fact that it was widely read,  that Gardner had put
much  of his own effort into it, and that Bell had  highly endorsed  it.50
Gardner  believed  that  the  proper  role  of  the  universities  was  to  continue
institution-building  programs  overseas.51 He  believed  the  universities  should  be given  a
"maximum  degree  of autonomy"52 to  perform  their  duties  and  to  determine  long-term
policy and program needs.  The short-term political battles should be the work of the agency
with little interference  from universities.  The Gardner Report gave  an analysis of most of
the  points  of interaction  between  the  agency  and  the  universities.  In  essence  Gardner
argues  that  each  organization  should  concentrate  on  its  particular  strengths  and  the
28functions it has been  trained to carry out with minimum interference  from the other.  His
analysis was widely read and discussed  and many of his minor reforms were put into place.
However, most of the major problems he enumerated  continued to persist after his report.
Soon after the Gardner Report was published, AID contacted the International Rural
Development  Subcommittee  of  the  National  Association  of  Land-Grant  Colleges  to
collaborate  in  "An  Analytical  Study  of AID  University  Contract  Projects  in  Agricultural
Education  and Research." 3 The  study was  a massive,  three-year  project  that summoned
the  input  of nine  universities  and  the  agency  to  help  shape  the  future  of  the  agency-
university  effort.  Because  of the  breadth of  university  involvement  in  the  study  and  the
insights  which  they  uncovered,  the  ten  recommendations  will  be  listed  and  discussed
below.4
Recommendations  of "An Analytical  Study  of AID  University
Contract Projects  in Agricultural Education and Research."
1) There  should be a stronger commitment  on the part of all participating  agencies
to an expanded  and long-term program  of building institutions to serve  agriculture.
The changing nature of aid, the pressures from Congress and the administration, and
the instability of the  agency  have  discouraged  both  organizations  from  making  long-term
29commitments to institution-building.  Without long-term commitments, many of the benefits
of the program are  lost because these benefits are not fully realized until five or ten years
into  the project.  This  in  turn discourages  both the  participation  of new  faculty  and  the
continued commitment of universities.  The agency may then concentrate their efforts within
the contract toward  achieving  quick returns  rather than meeting  the real needs of the  host
country, and  may fail to build  a strong foundation  within the  program for its future  work.
In large part, this lack of long-term commitment  is attributable to Congress' lack of patience
and insistence upon quick returns to investments.  It is exacerbated by the lack of a domestic
constituency  for foreign aid.
2)  More  flexible  project  agreements  and  improved  liaison  between  AID  and  the
university  community would  effect needed  improvements  in AID-university  relations.
The  universities  have  had  more  difficulties  dealing  with  AID  than  with  other
governmental  agencies.  The  report  cites  the  following  as  circumstances  which  are  each
partially responsible for these difficulties: "(a)  the service nature of technical  assistance, (b)
the  conduct of operations in  a foreign nation thousands of miles from the campus,  (c)  the
failure of the foreign  aid program  to achieve  solid support from  the American  public, (d)
the  "buyer-seller" approach  by the contracting  offices with the consequent  implication that
monitoring  the  actions  of  team  members  was  more  important  than  evaluating  project
achievement,  (e)  the feeling among  AID personnel  that university contracts  represented  a
30threat to their job security,  and (f) the unwillingness of some U.S. university team members
to coordinate  their work with  other  segments  of the  overall AID  program."55
3) Research on the institution building process should be significantly increased  and
existing knowledge  should be utilized  more effectively..
The process of institution-building is complicated.  At the time of the report relatively
little had been written to guide  that process.  The report  itself was  a positive first  step  in
that regard, but more study was needed.  Furthermore, the knowledge that was available was
often not tapped  effectively.  Administrators  in the  United  States were not  actively drawn
into the program,  and technical experts were  not utilized during the  orientation programs.
4) The basic ideas that underlie the land-grant  type institution are highly relevant in
technical  assistance projects  if properly understood and employed.
Two  characteristics  of many  host institutions  in  the  LDCs  have  complicated  the
transfer of the land grant concept  of agricultural  development based on teaching,  research
and service.  First, unlike the United States, the research and extension work in most LDCs
is performed  by the  government's  ministry  of agriculture  rather  than  by  the  universities.
Oftentimes  U.S.  advisers  have  dogmatically  advocated  a  shift  of responsibility  from  the
ministry  of agriculture  to the  universities.  This has  caused  a power  struggle  between  the
host institution and the host government  in some countries.  The  report recommends  that
31the universities  should translate  the land-grant  system  philosophy,  but not necessarily  the
U.S. structure,  into  the host's culture  to create  a suitable  system.56 Secondly,  many  LDC
universities were  begun  under  a European  educational  system which  stresses  basic  rather
than applied research.  Classes tend to be taught using a rote memory system,  so the switch
to a system which encourages creative thinking and problem-solving  has been difficult.  The
report  considers  these  two  characteristics  to  be  challenges  that  university  staff  must
overcome,  rather than grounds for dismissing  the land-grant  concept.
5)  Agreement  on  goals  and  commitment  to  an overall  strategy  by  host  and  U.S.
personnel  should be  strengthened  by wider participation  in project planning and review.
The  report  states  that  the  planning  process  needs  to  be  improved  and  that  the
resulting plan must be more clearly articulated.  Broader participation in the process is vital
in  this  regard.  The  implementation  of a project  should  follow  a well  determined  path
beginning  with  a  highly  visible  opening  project  implemented  by  U.S.  faculty,  to  the
development of host country participation,  and finally to a long-term partnership involving
the  exchange  of faculty and  research findings.
6) Those  aspects  of  technical  assistance  programs  which  have  contributed  to  the
highly  negative attitudes  of many  university staff members  and departments  heads  should
be changed.
32U.S. universities need to receive  benefits commensurate  with their costs in order to
be  committed  to  the AID  contracts  for  the  long-term.  The  costs  to  a  university  can  be
substantial.  Research shows that department heads who must temporarily fill vacated spots
for  professors  overseas  show  a  serious  lack  of enthusiasm  for the  program.57 Although
faculty  are  enriched  by  these  experiences,  department  heads  often  see  this work  as  an
interruption  in  the  proper  flow  of  program  development.58 As  a  result,  support  for
university field  teams has  at times been  lacking.
The  incentive  for faculty  members  has  also  been questioned.  Their  assignment  is
vague,5 9 opportunities  for  research  and  publication  are  limited,6  and  the  change  in
lifestyle  can  be  difficult.  In  the  judgement  of  Jackson  A.  Rigney,  then  Dean  of  the
International  Programs  at  North  Carolina  State  University,  "the  professional  costs  of
participating  in overseas  contracts under  previous styles of operation resulted in very little
if  any  professional  reward  to  the  individual,  with  a  consequent  serious  penalty  as  he
attempted  to re-enter the  domestic professional  stream." 6'  The report calls for the  agency
to extend  funding for faculty members  to include more time for orientation  before sending
faculty  overseas,  and more time  afterward  to reap  the benefits  of the  faculty  experiences.
Universities too are  called upon to better utilize these experiences.
7) There should be fundamental changes in orientation programs in order to prepare
team members  adequately for their  overseas  assignments.
33The cross-cultural  nature of technical  assistance  can create  significant challenges to
the U.S.  faculty.  Often  they are  required  to  communicate  in  a  new  language,  adapt  to
unfamiliar  customs,  and  rely  on  fewer  services  than  at  home.  Their work  is  often  quite
different, for  example  a professor  may take  on greater administrative  duties in the LDCs
than at home.  To be prepared for this change, faculty members require proper orientation
prior to their  appointments  overseas.  These  orientation programs  have been  criticized  as
being  too  limited.  Ideally  the  orientation  should  employ  the  resources  of staff members
returning from overseas.
8)  Programs  of  participant  training  should  be  more  carefully  planned  and  more
adequately supported so that they  conform to the developmental  needs of host institutions.
The  institution-building  projects  of the  U.S.  universities  are  dependent  upon  the
effectiveness  of staff members  to gain the ability to teach and  lead students and faculty  in
a foreign land and culture.  Learning the language  and adapting to the new culture are vital
ingredients  in this process.  It  is  during  the  orientation  process  that these  skills  must  be
improved.  In  addition,  the  orientation  process  also  gives  the  individual  participants  the
perspective on how this project fits into the whole picture in the LDCs and into AID's plans.
This orientation has been  haphazard.
9)  The  university  should  exert  its  leadership  in  developing  a  fuller  public
understanding  of international  technical  assistance.
34As noted earlier, one of the goals of developing the university contract system from
Harold Stassen to the present time was to engender a domestic constituency for foreign aid.
However, universities have not effectively  focused public attention  on their programs,  and
thus that constituency  has not coalesced.
10)  A.I.D and  the universities  should  cooperate  in strengthening  the international
capabilities  of U.S. universities.
Universities  have  special  skills to  assist the  LDCs, however  the conditions  in these
countries  are vastly  different  than in  the United States.  This  provision proposes  that  the
universities  need  to be  strengthened  in order to enter into  this work.
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university  Projects  1973-1982
TITLE  XII  AND  THE  NEW
DIRECTIONS  IN  U.S.  FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE:  1973-1982 
University involvement in foreign aid  ....  .
reached  its peak under the Democratically
controlled  administrations  of Kennedy and Johnson.  Large  investments  had been made in
institution-building  projects.  In  1969,  the  newly  elected  Nixon  administration  quickly
activated  changes in the foreign aid program.  In a message  to Congress  on  May 28,  1969,
Nixon  expressed  support  for  economic,  military  and  technical  assistance  programs  that
served both to aid other nations and to achieve security, market expansion, and goodwill for
the United States.62 Nixon proposed  three new initiatives:  a) the  establishment of a semi-
private organization called the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to expand
private enterprise, b) increased support for the international development banks that finance
United  Nations  technical  assistance  programs,  and  c)  the  expansion  of  U.S.  technical
assistance.63
36The United States increased its support for the United Nations programs and began
to fund up to 25%  of the core  costs of the Consultative  Group on International  Food  and
Agricultural  Research  (CGIAR).64 (U.S.  contributions  to this fund are discussed  in a later
section).  In order  to expand  U.S.  technical  assistance,  Nixon proposed  the  establishment
of  a  Technical  Assistance  Bureau  that  would  "devise  new  techniques,  evaluate  the
effectiveness  of programs,  and seek  out the best possible  people  in universities  and other
private  groups to direct  the programs."65
The  early  1970s  were  a  time  for  reevaluation  within  the  development  assistance
community.  Widespread hunger and new food shortages in a number of countries tempered
the excitement  of the Green Revolution and caused many people to question the means by
which development  was being achieved.  Congress  too was  impatient  and dissatisfied  with
the ability of U.S. foreign aid to quickly improve the welfare LDC peoples.  Reformers who
were  critical  of foreign  aid,  claimed  that  U.S.  aid  primarily  served  the elite  of recipient
countries  or  funded  broad-based  government  programs  that  did  not  directly  affect  the
poorest citizens.
In  1973,  Congress  amended  the  Foreign Assistance  Act  of  1961  to  include  a new
emphasis  on growth  with  equity.  This new  policy  was  patterned  after  the Basic  Human
Needs (BHN) strategy of development which the International Labor Organization  and the
World Bank had recently  adopted.  The approach  was  characterized  not by  research  into
specific  problems  of food production  but by  large-scale  capital  transfers  that targeted  aid
37directly to  the "poorest of the poor."  University  projects  had been  declining  dramatically
since the beginning  of the Nixon Administration,  and with  the passage  of this amendment
in  1973  the bias  against  agricultural  research was now  reflected in the law.
In response  to  this  bias  the  agency-university  program  searched  for  new  forms  of
cooperation.  Daniel Parker, AID's  administrator from 1973 to 1977, was a strong advocate
for developing  research services  within  AID.66  His first plan  was to use  a fraction of loan
repayments  from LDCs to the U.S. government  to fund an institution that could financially
support  agricultural  research.  However,  to achieve  Congressional  support for such  a plan
that would reduce  Congressional  control of funding was considered impossible.  The second
plan  was  to  devise  an  institutional  system  by  which  the  University  would  have  a  vested
interest  in  the  program,  and  thus  would  lobby  for  funding.  This  was  to  become  the
Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP), one of three key components of the Title
XII legislation  of 1975.
Title  XII Legislation
By  the  early  1970s  the  universities  and  AID  had  a  well-established  working
relationship.  Each  knew  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of their  collaboration.  The  new
emphasis on meeting  Basic Human  Needs through large-scale  capital transfers  threatened
to  decrease  or  eliminate  University  involvement  in  AID programs.  In  1975  Rep.  Paul
Findley  and Sen.  Hubert  Humphrey introduced  the  "Freedom From Hunger  and Famine
38Prevention Act of 1975,"  the Title  XII Amendment  to the Foreign Assistance  Bill of 1961.
The amendment sought to reinstate the idea that U.S. universities had a unique contribution
to make to the agricultural  development of LDCs, and that institutional  relations between
AID and the universities therefore  needed to  be strengthened.
The  proposed  amendment  consisted  of three  components.  First,  it  established  a
Board for International Food and Agricultural  Development (BIFAD) comprising members
from  both universities  and  the  general  public  to  oversee  the work  of the  AID-university
partnership.  Second,  it strengthened  the grants  program  to develop  the capability of U.S.
universities  to  carry  out international  development  projects  through  Title  XII.  Third,  it
established  the Collaborative  Research  Support  Program  (CRSP),  a program  to research
constraints  on food  production  and to  develop  strategies  to overcome these  constraints  in
both  the LDCs  and the  United  States.  The Title XII  amendment  was a  potential  turning
point in AID-university  relations because it promised strong Congressional  support for AID
as an institution.
The Board for International  Food and Agricultural Development
The  heart  of  the  Title  XII  legislation,  according  to  its  co-sponsor,  Sen.  Hubert
Humphrey,67 was  the  creation  of  the  Board  for  International  Food  and  Agricultural
Development (BIFAD), a semi-autonomous  advisory board of seven members chosen by the
President to act as a liaison between AID and the universities.  It was designed to empower
39and  focus  attention  on  U.S.  universities  to  better  utilize  their  expertise  in  foreign
assistance68  and  to bridge  the  often  difficult  communications  gap  between  AID  and  the
universities.  The BIFAD  is responsible  for helping to  develop  and administer  the  CRSPs
and other research programs, to strengthen  university involvement  in AID, and to evaluate
AID-university projects.  It was a new administrative  structure to help design and implement
all Title XII  programs.69 The  BIFAD's advisory role was designed  to extend beyond  Title
XII  to  P.L.  48070  and  other  programs  related  to AID's  agriculture,  food  and  nutrition
account  (section  103),  of which  Title  XII  is  only  a part.  Rather  than  designing  BIFAD
simply  to  represent  a  special  interest  competing  for  AID  funding,  "The  agreed  broader
approach permitted  the Board to make its recommendations  on the apportionment of funds
to Title XII activities in the  context of other requirements  of the  developing countries and
to seek  optimum  complementary  relationships  between  Title  XII  and  other  activities." 7 1
AID responded  that it  "warmly welcomes  and  will work energetically  to facilitate  this."72
The source  and  extent of the  BIFAD's  authority  have been  controversial.  A legal
staff  opinion  of  AID  in  1976  determined  that  the  BIFAD  was  officially  an  advisory
committee.73  But  the  first  BIFAD  chairman,  Clifton  Wharton,  declared  that  "there  is
agreement  that  the  Board  is  not  simply  an  advisory  committee,  although  for  AID
management  purposes,  BIFAD  is so  classified."74 He went  on to say,  "The Board  is not
in a position to operate programs  independently.  Its influence  on policy and programs will
be largely  dependent  on its  close  ties to universities,  its  relationship  to the  Administrator
and his  immediate  deputies,  and  its  independent  reporting  authority  to Congress  on Title
40XII  programs."75 The  strong  constraint  upon  BIFAD's  effectiveness  is  that  it  can  exert
influence  only  when  AID  is  committed  to  both  developing  Title  XII  and  to  following
BIFAD's advice. 7 This has potentially  limited  its effectiveness,  although during  the  early
period of Title XII AID was highly supportive  of BIFAD proposals.
The process of integrating BIFAD into Title XII leadership was both complicated and
slow.  Although the BIFAD was commissioned  in October  1976 its full involvement did not
begin until Fiscal Year  1979.
Strengthening  Grants Program
Congress  initiated  the  strengthening grants  program  to develop university  capacity
to eliminate  hunger and prevent famine.  Funds were provided  directly to universities and
were  spent primarily in the United States.  The grants provided through the program were
used  to  initiate  or  modify  courses  to give  them  more  of  an international  perspective,  to
support  graduate  students  and faculty  in research  on international  issues, and  to develop
new language  classes. 7
Initially, AID intended these grants to strengthen the universities with which AID had
worked,  but  the  Congressional  debate  changed  the  focus  to  include  universities  not
previously  involved in AID projects.7
41Four different  grants programs were implemented.  Each served  the same  goal:  to
strengthen the capacity of universities to engage in international work.  The grants programs
differed  only in the means by which to  achieve  that goal.  The four programs  included:
1) Strengthening  Grants  Program  1979-1985.
2)  Memorandums  of Understanding  1983-1989.
3) Joint  Memorandums  of Understanding  1986-1991.
4)  Matching  Support Grant Program begun  in 1986. 79
Universities  were  chosen  for strengthening  grants  based  on  the following  criteria:
evidence  of faculty  and  administrative  interest,  demonstrated  capabilities  in  agricultural
research,  a recommendation,  and the willingness  to  commit the institution to  the program
by matching  all AID funds, covering all  overhead  expenses or indirect costs, and using the
effect  of the grants  to  strengthen  the  capability  for  AID work.80  The  program  provided
each  institution with approximately  $100,000  yearly for five years.
By the mid-1980s the Strengthening Grants Program had successfully enhanced  and
expanded  the  capacity  for international  work in  a number  of universities.  Because  of its
cost,  however,  the  program  was  thought  to  be  too  politically  unfeasible  to  continue
indefinitely.  Thus a new program, the Memorandum of Understanding, was begun in 1983.
It was similar in intent but functioned  on a much smaller scale than its predecessor.  Funds
were given to only 5 colleges for a five-year period.81 Later, Congress established  the Joint
Memorandum  of Understanding  that paired colleges previously active in foreign assistance
42with Historically Black  Colleges and  Universities  to improve  the  capacity  of each to work
on AID  projects.  This program  received  strong  Congressional  and  presidential  support.
Finally in  1986,  the  universities  and AID jointly funded  a program,  the Matching Support
Grant  Program,  through  which  grants  were  allocated  on  a  competitive  basis.  This
competitive  program  had  the  advantage  of  being  more  politically  palatable  than  its
predecessors,  and therefore  it  may be  the most  likely program to continue  long-term.82
On  the  whole,  these  programs  reawakened  the  interest  and  commitment  of
universities  to agricultural  issues in developing  countries.  They broadened the experience
and the competence  of faculty members  and students  to engage in AID projects.  Erven J.
Long,  former director  of university  programs  for AID, counted  133  new courses  on LDC
agriculture  begun, 232 courses modified to be relevant to LDC agricultural issues, and 3580
persons enrolled  in these courses.8 3 Hundreds  of faculty and graduate students  were given
Title XII funds  to finance  research on developing  countries.
Although the strengthening grants programs honed universities'  skills in international
education  and  research,  AID  missions  did  not  actively  seek  out  new  contracts  with
universities.  Rather, throughout this whole period, support for AID-university collaboration
within  AID  and  particularly  in  the  AID  Missions  was  declining  rapidly.  Consequently,
universities were increasingly better prepared to provide foreign assistance, just as AID was
becoming  disenchanted  with  their partnership  with the  universities.  This program decline
is examined  in Chapter Five.
43Collaborative  Research  Support  Programs
The Collaborative Research  Support Program (CRSP)  is considered to be one of the
most effective programs  to engage  university expertise in foreign assistance.  An innovative
collaborative  relationship  reactivated  the participation  of U.S. universities  in international
research.  Institution-building,  which  created  the  capacity  for  LDCs to develop  their  own
indigenous  agricultural  technology,  had  been  the  focus  of much  of  the  AID-university
partnership.  However, the commitment  of AID to this program had declined  dramatically
by the early  1970s.  In conjunction with the adoption  of the Basic Human Needs  approach
to  development,  the  feeling  among  many  people  in  the  international  development
community was that U.S. foreign assistance  should finance action, not deliberation,  and that
research  was  disconnected  from  reality.84 Furthermore,  because  institution-building
programs lacked  a strong domestic  constituency  the support of Congress had  always  been
difficult  to  generate.  Finally,  as  had  been  the  case  with  much  of  their  history,  the
relationship between AID and the universities  tended to be frustrating.  Over time, each of
these reasons caused AID to decrease its  commitment to institution-building programs and
to look for new institutional  arrangements  for research.
Within  this  context,  the  Collaborative  Research  Support  Program  (CRSP)  was
devised.  The program is highly regarded primarily because it seeks to develop agricultural
technologies  that will  serve  the  self-interests  of both  LDCs  and  the  United  States.  Its
benefit to U.S.  agriculture  is twofold.  First,  it allows  U.S.  scientists  to work with  a much
44broader genetic range of plants and animals than if research  is performed  only within  U.S.
borders.  This range of genes is needed to  develop new breeds  that can be of benefit both
domestically  and  internationally.85  Second,  technology  such  as  pest  and  disease  control
methods can be exchanged  between countries.  For example,  the Hessian fly is  a problem
in both  Morocco  and  Kansas.8  Much  can  be  learned by  studying  the  problem  in  both
areas.  Because  the research  carried  out under  the CRSP has benefitted  U.S.  agriculture,
it has engendered  some support  among U.S. farmers  and farm organizations.
The CRSPs signaled a fundamental  philosophical  shift in U.S. foreign assistance  to
LDC agriculture.  Rather than the U.S. seeking either to inform other nations about proper
agricultural  techniques,  or  to  build  the  capacity  to  engage  in  teaching,  research,  and
extension  patterned  after  the  U.S.  model,  the  program  fostered  collaborative  work.  It
recognized  the  benefit to  U.S.  agriculture  from  the knowledge  of other  countries.87 The
relationship  between  the U.S.  and LDCs  in the  program was  perhaps more  a partnership
than  assistance.  The  program  also  changed  the  relationship  between  AID  and  the
universities.  Again, the work was collaborative and more like a partnership than direct-hire.
Rather than the contracts required in the institution-building program, universities received
grants and, therefore, more autonomy.'
Program  leadership  in  the  CRSPs  was  first  provided  by  the  Joint  Research
Committee  (JRC), a group under the direction  of BIFAD.  The JRC  was composed  of an
equal  number  of members  from  both AID  and the universities  along with  representatives
45from the U.S. Department  of Agriculture  and other organizations.  The JRC and the Joint
Committee  on Agricultural  Development  (JCAD)  ultimately  were  combined  to form  the
Joint  Committee  on  Agricultural  Research  and  Development  (JCARD).  Initially,  the
criteria  for setting priorities for  the CRSPs  were  the following:
1. The relative  importance  of the problem  to the  developing countries.
2.  The  interest  and  competence  of  U.S.  universities  to  work  on  these
problems.
3.  The extent  to which  the problem,  if solved,  would  contribute  to  the well
being of the very poor people  in the  developing  countries  (reflecting AID's
emphasis at  that time on solving  the problems  of the very poor),
4. The likelihood  that important progress could  be made through research on
the subject matter  area within a reasonable  length of time.89
The first programs  were:
1. Small Ruminants  (Sheep  and  Goats),
2. Sorghum  and Millet,
3. Tropical  Soils Management,
4. Food Legumes  (Beans and Cowpeas),
5. Human  Nutrition  (Effects of Marginal  Malnutrition),  and
6. Fisheries and Aquaculture,
a. Pond Dynamics,  and
46b. Stock Assessment.
Once the priorities were set for the type of work to be completed, the organizational
structure  had  to be  developed  and the  people recruited.  The JRC  established  planning
entities for each CRSP to formulate policy.  The planning  entity then chose a management
entity  to integrate  and manage  the  work and  the  funding  of each part of its CRSP.  For
example,  the  Small  Ruminants  CRSP  had  13  U.S.  institutions90  working  at  17  different
sites  researching  various  aspects  of  the  project,  all  of  which  were  coordinated  by  the
management  entity.
An  effective  innovation  of the  CRSPs  is  the  use  of external  evaluations  to  guide
programs.  These external panels are composed of experts who are not directly involved in
the program.  Evaluations tend to be objective and critical.  In general, CRSPs have learned
the  lessons  of the  past  and  have  become  an  effective  means  of  developing  appropriate
agricultural  techniques.  CRSPs  are  able  to  engender  political  support which  means  that
long-term  planning  and  commitments  are  possible.  This  support  is  vital  to  research
programs.  The design of the CRSPs provides  an effective organization,  and yet they allow
for  appropriate individual  initiative.  By most accounts,  the CRSPs have been  a refreshing
and highly effective  initiative  in the AID-university  relationship.
The Bi-national  Agricultural Research  and Development  Fund (BARD)
47An alternative approach in bilateral  collaborative  research was begun in  1977 when
the  United  States  and  Israel  developed  the  Bi-national  Agricultural  Research  and
Development  (BARD)  program.  Like the CRSPs,  this program is  collaborative,  although
it  links  only  the  U.S.  and  Israel.  The  program  is  funded  by  interest  earned  on  an
endowment  created  by  the  equal  contributions  of monies  from both  nations  rather  than
through  the  political process  inherent  in  CRSP budgeting. 9 1 The  focus of its  research  is
on high-value  agricultural  production  --  including  nuts, fruits,  fish,  dairy,  and poultry  --  in
the arid  regions  of both  countries.  In contrast  to  the  CRSP  research  that often  seeks  to
benefit  consumers  by  improving  the  productivity  of staple  crops,  BARD  research  often
benefits  farmers  because  of the  high  elasticities  of demand  for  these  goods.  Of the  208
BARD projects completed by 1988, 20 had produced a commercial application in the United
States, while  23  more had commercial potential. 9
Review  of Title XII  Progress
Eighteen  months  after  its  inception,  Title  XII  was  reviewed  by  the  Senate
Subcommittee  on Foreign Assistance.  Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative  Paul
Findley (sponsors  of the bill in 1975) were concerned with the lack of progress for Title XII
programs.  Don Paarlberg 93 --  a leader  in the  formation  of Title XII,  former staff member
of the  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture,  and  Professor  Emeritus  at  Purdue  University  --
enumerated  four areas in which the AID-university collaboration had failed to live up to its
potential:  the program lacked  a clear mandate,  its sense of mission was unclear,  its financial
48resources  were  too  limited,  and  the  organizational  structure  was  not  sound.4  Paarlberg
also identified three  hazards  that must be  overcome  in order  to implement  the Title XII
legislation:  AID inertia,  University  duplicity,  and  Congressional  impatience.95 Although
Dr. Paarlberg's comments were made specifically in regard to the Title XII program in 1977,
his testimony is perhaps one of the better analyses of the structural problems faced  by AID
and the universities  in their collaboration.
1)  As a result of 25 years of annual battles with Congress over funding and support
for the organization  and its programs,  some AID officials  "have grown battle-scarred  and
gun-shy.  Many bright prospects have flashed  across the horizon and disappeared.  Visions
and promises  have  failed.  There  is  a tendency  to treat Title XII  as another  one  of these
bright  hopes, probably headed  for disappointment." 96 Paarlberg noted further,  "the wisest
thing, some think, is to avoid going overboard on it, to fold it in with ongoing programs,  and
to give it less visibility,  a kind  of fail-safe  attitude." 97 This type  of attitude  does not  allow
the program to grow and prosper.  The focus  of one's commitment  becomes  the agenda or
status  quo rather than the goal to be achieved.
2)  Universities have not always used Title XII funds properly.  A few programs that
were  essentially  domestic in  nature were  funded under the guise  of an international  title.
Moreover,  "promising  overseas  projects  might  be  staffed  with  persons  whose  chief
qualifications were  that they fit poorly into the  domestic operations."98
493)  Congress  must become  more patient with  the program.  They must realize  that
it took perhaps  80 years9 for U.S.  agriculture  to  benefit from  the tremendous  agricultural
advances developed at land-grant universities.  The development of the LDCs may not take
80 years,  but Congress  must understand  that international  agricultural  research  also  takes
many  years  to mature.  It would  be  unrealistic  to  expect  quick  returns  on these  type  of
foreign assistance  investments.10
Essentially,  Paarlberg  said  that AID and  universities  need each  other.  When  each
institution  focuses  on  the  mission  at  hand,  its  relative  strengths  are  utilized  and
disagreements are minimized.  Paarlberg's analysis echoes the same issues identified in 1964
by  John  Gardner  AID  and  the  Universities.10 AID  participation  is  needed  for  its
international focus and coordination efforts,  and for its diplomatic, budgetary, and political
skills.  University participation  is needed for project staffing and technical skills.  Both will
benefit,  though  in  different  ways,  from  a  successful  Title  XII  program,  and  yet  each  is
dependent upon the work of the other.  The crucial issue  to  the success  of the program  is
the  ability to coordinate  their goals  and  commitments.
Significant  changes  occurred  in  1980  in  the Title XII  program.  First,  AID became
part of the International  Development  Cooperation  Agency  (IDCA),  a  dream of the  late
Sen.  Hubert Humphrey.  This new organization  served  as an umbrella  for all U.S. foreign
assistance  programs.  It was hoped that this structure would improve  coordination between
assistance  agencies.  Second,  Title  XII  activities  were  to  be  placed  under  the  newly
50established  Institute for  Scientific and Technical  Cooperation.  Although  the institute was
authorized,  it received  no funding.'0 2
The  1980 Report to  Congress described  the AID-university  relationship  as follows:
Mutual understanding between AID and the universities continues to improve.
AID  is  making  several  modifications  in  approach  and  procedure  which
improve  university  performance  in  carrying  out  AID  technical  assistance
programs.  Universities  increasingly  recognize  that  many  problems  are
inherent  in the  task  itself.  They  are  taking several  measures  to strengthen
their capabilities  to deal with these problems  and to do even  more effective
technical  assistance  work in the future.' 03
The Consultative  Group on  International Agricultural Research  (CGIAR):  An  Alternative
to the University Model
During  the  New  Directions  Period,  AID  began  to  support  a  significant  parallel
development in agricultural research on the problems in developing countries.  It committed
itself  to  funding  25%  of  the  annual  budget  of  the  Consultative  Group  on  International
Agricultural  Research  (CGIAR)  that directs  the  work  of the  International  Agricultural
Research  Centers (IARC).  The IARCs presently number  13,  and in one year  (1984)  their
annual budget was  $177.9  million.
The IARCs were begun as a collaboration of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.
Each  had  a  history  of  support  for  international  development  projects.  The  Rockefeller
Foundation  had  put  together  a  strong  cadre  of  scientists  during  its  sponsorship  of
educational and research-oriented  programs in Mexico.  Following some excellent  advances
51in plant breeding,  the Rockefeller  Foundation planned to tackle the problem of improving
the food supply problem  in Asia.  It was unable  to raise local  support for the project,  so it
turned  for  additional  funding  to  the  financially  strong  Ford  Foundation  which  had  also
established  a track record  of work  in international  development.
Their first joint project was the  International  Rice Research  Institute  (IRRI)  in the
Philippines,  established  in  1960.'04 The  combination  of the  Rockefeller  Foundation's
research  experience  and  cadre  of scientists  and  the  Ford  Foundation's  financial  backing
created a strong institute that contributed to significant increases in agricultural productivity
in India that  has popularly  been called  the Green  Revolution. 1 05 Between  1960 and  1966
the two foundations  also created  the International  Maize and Wheat Improvement  Center
(CIMMYT) in Mexico, the International  Institute of Tropical Agriculture  (IITA) in Nigeria,
and  the International  Center  for  Tropical  Agriculture  (CIAT)  in  Colombia.'6  In  1967,
each foundation agreed  to limit contributions  to the four centers to $3  million annually,  an
amount that was inadequate for further growth but would encourage  cost-effective research.
More  important,  the  funding  cap  encouraged  the  research  centers  to  seek  funding  from
other public sources.'07 One of these  sources  was AID.
AID became committed  to funding the International  Agricultural Research  Centers
in  1969 at the Bellagio  Conference.  AID had earlier provided  one-time  grants of $350,000
(in  1965)  and  $400,000  (in  1968)  to  IRRI  to  develop  machinery  and to  cover  disastrous
harvests  in India and Pakistan.  The Bellagio Conference  was a meeting of representatives
52of the  World  Bank,  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP),  the  United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the Rockefeller  and Ford Foundations, and the
government  aid  organizations  of the  United  States,  Canada,  Sweden,  and  Great Britain.
Forrest F. Hill of the Ford Foundation expressed  the need for international  cooperation on
technical  development.  In  response,  the  president  of  the  World  Bank,  Robert  S.
McNamara,  suggested the concept of a consultative group to coordinate fundraising  efforts.
This was to become the CGIAR.  The AID administrator, John Hannah,  pledged to produce
a U.S. commitment  to pay up to 25%  of the CGIAR's  operating budget.' 08
Since  the  Bellagio  Conference,  the  United  States  through  AID  has  faithfully
supported  the IARCs,  and from  the  early  1970s  through  the mid  1980s  has  continued  to
cover  nearly  25%  of CGIAR's  budget.  The IARCs  have  grown  to  include  institutes  or
programs that research plant genetics,  livestock production, plant and animal diseases, food
policies,  farming systems research,  and national agriculture research  systems in addition to
the original  research  on  a variety  of specific  commodities.  The  sum  total of the IARC's
work has  greatly reduced  the constraints  that limit agricultural  productivity.
The success  of the IARCs  can be attributed  to three areas  in which  they  are differ
from bilateral  technical assistance  agencies.  The IARCs are not subject to direct political
interventions  and can determine  their research  goals on the basis of need and opportunity
rather  than political  priorities.  They have  been able to  draw  from  a broad  international
scientific community  in building their  staffs.  And finally, they  have developed  an effective
53management  system  to  guide  their  programs.1 9 With  the  effectiveness  of  the  IARCs,
some  observers  have  questioned  the  need  for  the  AID-university  programs  that  build
agricultural  educational,  research  and extension centers  in developing  countries.
These  national  agriculture  research  systems  (NARS)  are  needed  for  a  variety  of
reasons, but two  are especially  pertinent to this discussion.  First,  a majority of the IARCs
research  is strategic  in nature.10 To  be useful  to  a farmer,  the research  must  be  adapted
to the local  agro-climatic region by scientists working in the region.  Second,  the IARCs  do
not possess an effective extension  capacity.  The  centers rely on the  NARS to transmit  the
new technologies  to local farmers.  The skill to transmit technology requires a sophisticated
system  and  technically  trained  faculty.  "It  has  been  widely  accepted  that  the  ability  to
screen, borrow, and adapt scientific knowledge and technology requires essentially the same
capacity as  is required to  invent  new technology.""'
An effective  international  agricultural  research  system requires the  services of both
international  and  national  research  systems.  The  IARCs  are  able  to  capitalize  upon
intercountry economies  of scale  to perform  broad commodity-based  research  and to assist
in  the  coordination  of technology  transfer  and  adoption.  The role  of the  university  is to
carry  out  research,  teaching  and  extension  that  is  location-specific  and  applied.  The
university meets the needs  of its local constituents  by  developing  its own strategic  research
and  modifying  and  adopting  appropriate  technology  developed  by  IARC research.  As  a
54result of this complementary  interaction, there exists a synergistic relationship  between the
IARCs and the National Agricultural  Research  Systems.
In an effort to improve  the  application  of strategic  research  findings  at the  IARCs,
CGIAR established the International  Service  for National Agricultural  Research  (ISNAR)
in  1979  to identify  problems  in  and  encourage  the  development  of national  agricultural
systems.
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University  Projects  1983-1996
THE  DECLINE  OF  UNIVERSITY 
PARTICIPATION  IN  U.S.  FOREIGN  '
ASSISTANCE:  1983-1991 
The  change  from  the  Carter  ..  ....  .
administration  to  the  Reagan
administration  was accompanied  by a decrease  in policy-level  support  for Title XII.  One
of the hallmarks  of the  Carter  administration  was the  president's  commitment  to  human
rights.  Support  for foreign  assistance  was part  of this  policy.  In fact,  Carter  pledged  to
double  the  percentage  of  U.S.  support  for  foreign  assistance  from  one-quarter  of  one
percent  of  GNP  to  one-half  of  one  percent  (matching  the  level  under  the  Kennedy
Administration).  Although fiscal constraints and inflation impeded the achievement of this
goal, the policy commitment to assist the long-term economic growth of developing countries
was still evident.
The focus  of foreign  assistance  clearly  changed  under  the Reagan  administration 12
Foreign assistance was intended less to support long-term growth  and more to secure short-
56term political  and  strategic  goals  and  to  provide  emergency  famine  relief.  One  of the
distinguishing  characteristics  of  the  Reagan  administration  was  the  emphasis  on  the
privatization of public services and encouragement of free enterprise.  The foreign assistance
programs  reflected  this  ideology  by  increasing  the  use  of private  consulting  firms  for
research  and Private  Voluntary  Organizations  (PVO's) for  technical  and relief services." 3
It was this new policy direction during the eight years of the Reagan Administration,
coupled with an increasing dissatisfaction of AID personnel with the Title XII program that
led to the decline of University involvement  in foreign assistance  and which now threatens
its very  existence.
During Reagan's presidency, the involvement of universities in AID projects declined
rapidly.  Title XII projects declined from  42 in 1982 to just  8 in  1988.114  During the same
period, the percentage of funds within AID's Agriculture, Rural Development, and Nutrition
account (ARDN), which were designated for Title XII projects also diminished.  The decline
has  caused considerable  concern  in the university  community.
From  1981  to  1986  the  agency  had  an  administrator,  M.  Peter  McPherson,  who
actively  supported the goals  of Title  XII.  McPherson had previously served  as a member
of  the BIFAD.  A  few  months  after taking  office  McPherson  and  the  BIFAD  chairman
Clifton Wharton signed a Joint Resolution  of AID and the BIFAD regarding Title XII.  It
expressed  a  mutual  support  at  the  highest  levels  for  the  AID-university  collaboration.
57However,  this  resolution  was  insufficient  to  bolster  support  for  Title  XII  throughout  the
agency,  particularly among AID missions  (AID/M).
In  1986  McPherson  conducted  a  survey  of officials at AID/Washington  (AID/W),
AID/M, and university representatives regarding the Title XII program.  AID/M criticized
universities  for showing  little  commitment  to the program,  for supplying  to AID projects
long-term personnel  who were  of poor  quality,  and for ineffective  contract  management.
In response to this survey universities  expressed  their concern  that their capabilities
in agriculture were not fully appreciated  by AID; that AID relied too heavily on procedures
for project implementation  which in turn interfered with addressing substantive issues; that
bidding procedures were skewed toward private  firms; and that universities should be more
involved  in planning processes." 5
According  to the 1989 GAO review of Title XII programs, the reasons for the decline
in  the  program  include:  a  decrease  in  the  overall  funding  for  the  Agriculture,  Rural
Development  and Nutrition  that finances Title  XII; Congressional  earmarks  to PVOs that
compete  with Title XII; and the  trend toward  developing  private sector initiatives."1
E.T.  York, Jr.,  Chancellor  Emeritus  of the  State University  system  of Florida  in a
paper  prepared  for  the  Office  of  Technology  Assessment,  described  the  circumstances
limiting the achievements  of the Title XII program:
581.  Decline  in support for Title  XII Assistance.
2.  Decentralization  of AID  decision-making.
3.  Lack  of continuity of AID and  university personnel.
4.  Shortage  of Technical Personnel  in AID.
5.  Lack of support for Title XII  by AID professionals.
6.  Competition with private sector firms.
7.  Procurement  and contracting procedures.
8.  Failure  of universities  to involve  their best personnel.17
In  December  1990,  the  agency  published  its  position  papers  outlining  a  plan  to
reorganize  the agency.  The new initiatives for the agency  include  1) promoting democracy
and  democratic  institutions  2)  creating  a  partnership  for  business  and  development  3)
encouraging  family  development  4)  promoting  environmental  security.  The  final  paper
discussed  AID's  new strategic  management  system by which  the  agency  plans  to improve
quality and  efficiency  as it streamlines  operations:  "AID  is working  on its ship of state  in
two ways:  one will repair and  remove the barnacles  from the hull and  tighten the rigging,
revitalize  the  crew  and  polish  the  brass,  while  the  other  will  adjust  the  navigational
instruments  and set the  course for the  right place  on the  horizon."11 8
The reports seem to indicate that the university program  is one  of those "barnacles"
that is to be repaired  or removed  from AID.  According  to the position papers, the  limited
59role  of universities  in  the  new  AID  plan  is  to  assist  in  the  business  and  development
initiative.  The report uses strong language to indicate  that the AID-university  relationship
will be changing.  "No longer can AID afford exclusive, entitlement-style  relations with U.S.
universities.  We  need to create processes that are inclusive and competitive, able to adapt
to changing times and requirements,  and to grow with the dynamic change occurring in the
developing  countries."" 9 Two  new  programs  were  initiated:  1) The  Creation  of  the
Center for  University Cooperation  in  Development  and  2)  the  linkage  of U.S.  and  LDC
business  schools.
The Center for University Cooperation  in Development combines  BIFAD's support
staff and  AID's  Office  of Research  and University  Relations  under the  authority  of the
Bureau  for  Science  and  Technology.  The Center  will  administer  all  Title  XII programs
which increasingly  will be  limited  to linking  U.S. universities with  LDC institutions,  and it
will serve the newly named Board for International Food and Agricultural Development and
Economic Cooperation  (BIFADEC).
The new BIFADEC is designed to broaden the pool of university resources available
to  AID  beyond  the  resources  of  the  land-grant  colleges.  Perhaps  more  significant,
BIFADEC has lost  its authority  to report directly  to the AID administrator  and  has been
placed  instead  under the  Bureau  of Science  and Technology.  This  new designation  has
changed the original conception of the BIFAD as a semi-autonomous  committee that could
comment on and  influence  agency  policies from a position outside  AID control.
60The creation of the Center for University Cooperation and the BIFADEC signal that
AID is reducing the traditional use of universities and their agricultural expertise.  Appendix
D  documents  the  rapid  decline  of  the  number  of University  projects  since  1982.  New
institution-building  projects will continue  to be few if any.1 20 The program  support grants
will be ended  in 1992, and will be replaced by the Linkages Program.  Under this program
a variety of colleges in addition to the major research institutions in LDCs and in the United
States will  form partnerships  for joint research  and  teaching.  It remains  to be  seen  how
these  new  initiatives  will  affect  the  CRSP  program.  An  ambitious  BIFADEC  budget
proposal  calls  for an  additional  $8.3  million  for  CRSPs  and  a  10  percent  increase  above
1990  levels  for activities  in  agriculture  production.'21  However,  there  is little written  in
the  new  AID  initiatives  or  other  current  analyses  to  suggest  that  agricultural  university
projects  will not continue to decline.
Ultimately these new initiatives will dilute the work of the universities.  First, as the
universities  are  asked  to  expand  the  type  of  projects  in  which  they  engage,  the  role  of
agricultural  development will be significantly reduced.  This  is also reflected in the  change
from  BIFAD  to  BIFADEC.  Second,  more  institutions  will  be  employed  to implement
technical assistance projects (from 70 land-grant and Historically Black Colleges to over 400
institutions,  including  community  colleges).  Finally,  as  the  focus  of university  programs
changes,  the  resources  available  dwindles.  Fewer  dollars  are  being  spent  over  more
universities  to meet  a broader project  agenda.
61CHAPTER  SIX
RECURRING  ISSUES IN AGENCY-UNIVERSITY  RELATIONS
We academicians cannot excuse our shortcomings by pointing a finger
at  the  federal  government  and  claiming  that  we  need  more  freedom  and
longer-term  commitment  of  funds.  As  true  as  that  may  be,  the  federal
administrators  of the  funds in  turn need only reply  that contracts  may well
grow longer-term when universities can demonstrate a viable planning process
and an overseas  record  equal to the inherent political risks.  For this chicken
and egg situation, we need  a cooperative  effort by government and university
to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  universities,  participation  overseas.'22
(Emphasis  added)
In  this  chapter  we  turn  from  tracing  the  historical  trends  of  the  U.S.  technical
assistance  programs to a more explicit assessment of the factors which  have contributed to
the  successes  and  failures  of the  agency-university  partnership.  As  indicated  earlier,  the
program is losing  support within the agency  because  of poor performance  in recent years.
Both  the universities  and the  agency  have contributed  to  this  poor performance,  but  we
contend  here  that  the  U.S.  technical  assistance  enterprise,  in general,  has  been  strongly
guided  to  failure  by  both  the  Congress  and  the  presidential  administrations.  Indeed,
analyses  of the 40 years  of technical  assistance  to  the needy  has  led  to agreement  on  the
role  and  the  mechanisms  for  AID,  the  universities,  Congress,  administrations,  and  host
country governments  to be  effectively  engaged in technical  assistance.
62Idealized  Modes  of Participation in the Program
The Agency for International  Development
The  agency  is  the  lead  institution  in  this  partnership.  It  has  both  the  financial
resources  and the contacts  within LDCs  to implement the  programs.
For a partnership with the universities to be effective,  the agency must first commit
to long-term support for a program.  University  projects  are often slow to mature yet they
can bring lasting results.  The Morocco project initially produced very negative evaluations,
for example,  but the continuing support of the agency has allowed the Hassan II University
to become  a  leading  institution  in  the  region.  It  now  has  the  capability  to  educate  all
Moroccan  B.S.  and M.S. agriculture  students.  AID itself concluded  that longer university
development  projects are more successful.  "Project experience indicates  that it takes  10 to
15 years  to train  a critical  mass  of host-country  faculty,  and  then another  decade  to build
a sufficient base  of experience  for conducting  an effective  research  program."'23
In addition,  the  agency  must facilitate  a  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with  the
universities.  Commitments  must be rewarded.  The  incremental nature under which  the
Moroccan project was managed,  for example, rewarded good work and thus kept standards
high for both organizations.  As a sense of trust developed, the interaction grew and became
more profitable for both AID and  the University.
63The Universities
In their role of supplying technical assistance, the universities must also be committed
to the program.  To be effective,  their international  work must not become  an appendage
to  customary  activities  but  rather  an  integral  facet  of their institutional  mission.'24  They
must provide competent faculty members for work assignments and ensure that assignments
overseas  do  not  impede  the  ability  of faculty  to  achieve  tenure.'2  Universities  should
concentrate  on work in the areas in which they  have a comparative  advantage:  institution-
building126 and  collaborative  research.127 Finally,  universities  must  commit  themselves
to proper backstopping  of the program  by being efficient  and timely in the administration
of AID-university  agreements  and  accommodating  to reasonable  agency procedures.  This
will  build  a sense  of cooperation  with the  agency.
The  Congress and the  State Department
The Congress  and  the  State  Department  must be  committed  to long-term  funding
that  will  build  a  sense  of  trust  between  all  organizations.  They  are  responsible  for
consistency  in funding the  program.
Broad Issues  in the Agency-Universitv  Partnership
64Undergirding  collaborative  technical  assistance  work  must be a strong sense of the
mission to be  accomplished  and a cooperative  working  relationship.  This  is a partnership
project to achieve a common goal.  The ultimate success of each organization is inextricably
linked with the other organizations.  Institutional arrangements have inhibited this sense of
mission and cooperation,  and have ultimately  undermined the  commitment of each  of the
organizations  to  the program.  An analysis  of these institutional  relationships  follows.
AID-university  technical  assistance  programs  were  formed  by  the  agency's
constituents  --  Congress  and  the  administration.  Although  the  program  received
authorization  and  funding,  it  was  never  given  a  strong foundation.  Factors  which  have
precluded  the  establishment  of this foundation  include  agency  reorganizations,  changes  in
program  goals, and  the  necessity  to justify  its  existence.  Thus  the program  often  lacked
stability.  As a result, agency personnel were limited both in their freedom to design projects
that responded  to  the  needs  of its  beneficiaries  and  in  their  ability  to  establish  strong
institutional  commitments.
Foreign  assistance  programs  in  general  are  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of
uncertainty.  In  order  for  these  programs  to  be  implemented  successfully  the  various
participants  must  undertake  a  great  deal  of  planning  to  coordinate  their  actions.
Coordination between two parties may be achieved  by various means.  For example,  under
a  hierarchical  system,  the  requests  of the  people  in authority  coordinate  actions;  and  in  a
marketplace  actions  are  coordinated  by  the  pricing  mechanism.  Given  that  neither  a
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partnership,  coordination must be achieved  through negotiation or bargaining.  Of the three
coordinating systems -- hierarchical authority, market, and bargaining -- the latter is the most
costly  in terms of time and uncertainty.  This  is especially  true when neither  organization
has the initial power to exert authority over the other.  In the agency-university partnership,
AID controls both the funds and  policy direction  of the program, but because it must enter
into  agreements  or  contracts  with  the  universities,  it has  no  inherent  authority  over  the
universities and their decisions.  In the same manner, although universities can influence the
agency  by lobbying Congress,  they have little authority  over the agency.
Bargaining  can  take place  on  a number  of different  levels.  In  the  AID-university
program, some bargaining  is done on a programmatic  level between the leaders of AID/W
and the leaders  of the universities  (universities  are usually represented  by  the NASULGC
or since  1975 by the  BIFAD).  Bargaining  also occurs  on a project level  between  AID/M
and a particular university.  Where it is feasible, efficiencies are gained by bargaining on the
programmatic as opposed  to the project level.  In addition to its use for a specific program
or  project,  negotiation  is  also  used  to  establish  norms  of coordination.  These  norms  of
coordination are patterns of interaction with other organizations that guide that interaction.
They constrain the variety of potential directions of an organization  by limiting it to certain
patterns  of  behavior.  This  allows  each  organization  to  form  expectations  regarding  the
future  of their program.
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improve  the implementation  of the  programs.  Coordination  norms are necessary  for  two
organizations  to  achieve  any  goal  that  involves  the  work  of  both.  The  norms  reduce
uncertainty and build a sense of trust between  the organizations.  It  is the responsibility of
the leaders  of the program  to create  these coordination  norms.
Leaders use their resources  -- their powers of persuasion  or the authority granted to
them by their positions  -- to create a culture within  an organization  and coordination  norms
between organizations.  This culture is a set of norms and expectations  that guide individual
and group goals  and  objectives.  For example,  a strong culture  was  developed  during  the
Bell  Administration  and  it  clearly  facilitated  a mutually  productive  relationship  between
AID  and  the  universities,  but  this  culture  was  missing  during  the  Stassen  and  Hollister
administrations.  The university  program  was used  by Stassen  for intermediate  goals:  to
satisfy  personnel  reduction  requirements  as  mandated  by  Congress  and  to  establish  a
domestic constituency for the entire foreign aid program.  Under Hollister the program was
beset  by  the  agency's  cost-cutting  measures  and  its  growing  adherence  to  the  goal  of
maintaining proper procedures  over  and  above  the goal  of obtaining  successful  outcomes
from  foreign  assistance.  In  its  40  year  history,  the  agency  has  had  great  difficulty  in
establishing  coordination  norms  and  a  sense  of  direction.  Part  of  the  difficulty  in
establishing coordination norms results from the multitude of AID's goals.  A proper system
to facilitate work  cannot be developed  when  the ultimate goal of that work is ambiguous.
67The  multiplicity  of goals is evident  in  the foreign assistance  legislation.  Embedded
in  the  legislation  are  33  objectives.  One  AID  document  listed  75  priorities  for  foreign
assistance. 1 28 Given  AID's  limited  budget  and  the  broad  scope  of  the  Congressional
objectives,  it was  impossible  for  AID  to  meet  each  one.  Leaders  of AID  must not only
decide  how a program will fulfill its objectives,  but also must delineate which  objectives of
the stated goals  to pursue.
Moreover,  these objectives change over time.  A 1989 study completed for the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs noted "the program began with an emphasis on large resource
transfers  during  the  Marshall  Plan,  shifted  toward  technical  assistance  during  Point Four,
to infrastructure during the  1960s, to basic human needs during the  1970s, and finally to the
role  of markets  and policy  reform  during  the  1980s."129  A bureaucracy  as  fragmented  as
AID, with offices world-wide cannot respond quickly to changes in its mission which require
reorganizing operating  systems,  hiring personnel with skills in new areas of assistance,  and
transferring personnel whose jobs are no longer needed to other areas.  Mission changes can
be particularly cumbersome for long-term programs such as the AID-university program that
by design do not respond  quickly  to new policy  initiatives.
Defining the objectives for the program or an individual  project is made even more
difficult  because  foreign  assistance  programs  often  are used  to  achieve  a  goal  that  is  an
intermediate  step toward an ultimate goal.  For example, much of foreign aid has been used
to ultimately  contain communism.  For many policy  makers,  the goal  of development  is an
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communism may interfere with the intermediate goal of agricultural  development,  and vice
versa.  The  conflict between  intermediate  and  ultimate  goals  adds  to the  confusion within
the program,  and has caused  disagreements  between  AID  and the  universities.
Under  conditions  of  uncertainty  in  implementation  and  uncertainty  in  program
direction,  strong  leadership  is  needed.  However,  the  leadership  in  AID  is  severely
constrained  by Congress.  In order for leadership  to be  effective,  leaders need  freedom to
mobilize  resources  to  achieve goals.  With limitations  on either freedom  or resources,  the
potential  for leadership  is constrained.  The resources of AID leaders include the authority
of their position, the ability to direct  subordinates,  the analysis policy, and the control  over
the budget.  However,  Congress  has increasingly  been limiting  their freedom  to use  these
resources.  For  example,  for  fiscal  year  1989,  "92%  of  military  aid,  98%  of  ESF  [the
Economic  Support  Fund],  and 49%  of development  assistance"  was earmarked  often  to a
specific  country.1 30  Congress  has not made  a full  commitment  to  the  sustainability  or the
autonomy of the program.  Without this commitment,  AID cannot exert effective leadership
and the program  suffers.
The  lack  of  full  Congressional  commitment  to  the  program  often  becomes  clear
during hearings on foreign assistance.  One year, in a preliminary vote on foreign assistance,
the  Senate  literally  voted  the  agency  out of  existence.'3 '  More  common  are  the  annual
speeches  that declare that U.S.  taxpayer's  money must be a spent at home to be beneficial
69to  Americans.  Even  among  those  congressmen  attending  the  hearings  who  are  better
acquainted  with  the program,  there  is  bitter conflict  over  the  support for and  direction  of
the  program.  To be  sure,  certain  congressmen  have  been  strongly  supportive  of  foreign
assistance  and of Title XII,  and they have been very helpful to the  universities.  But many
congressmen  are  uncomfortable  supporting  any  foreign  assistance  program  when there  is
little support from their constituency.  Lacking this support, their desire for a secure return
on their commitment  of funds is increased.
A more subtle sign of the lack of Congressional commitment  to foreign assistance in
general  is  the numerous  reporting  requirements  that  Congress  demands  from AID.  The
foreign  assistance  legislation  calls  for 288  of these  reporting  requirements  and  over  700
notifications  of project  changes  each  year.132 Congressman  Lee Hamilton explained  that
"a  principal  cause  of  the  numerous  congressionally  mandated  earmarks,  conditions,
restrictions,  reporting  requirements,  is  that  the  Congress  has  serious  doubts  about  the
manner  in  which  the  executive  branch  administers  the  program."'33 Accounting  for  the
AID program  which  has  been  called  "extensive  but  ineffective,"'34 tends  to focus  on  the
changes needed in the program rather than on analyzing how effective the  total program  is
in meeting  its ultimate  objectives.  Most  AID evaluations  focus on the  project rather than
on the programmatic level,' 35 and therefore the focus of change pertains almost  exclusively
to the  procedures  and processes  of foreign  assistance  rather  than to the ideals and goals.
70Congressional  micro-management  of AID has strongly influenced  the agency.  Some
of the more negative effects  of this intervention include  the weakening of AID leadership,
the lack of investment in long-term projects, the lack of investment in the long-term viability
of the agency itself, the inability to establish norms of coordination with universities and host
country governments, and ultimately  the defection  of AID from the university program and
the failure of their partnership.  (In a subsequent section we show that these conditions are
exacerbated  by  the needs and the responses  of the  university  community).
The effects  of Congressional  controls  on AID may be  summarized  as  follows:
1)  Leaders  tend  to  become  managers.  Congress  has  tied  the  hands  of  AID
personnel  by  earmarking  funds,  micro-managing  the  direction  of  the  program,  and
demanding  excessive  reporting  requirements.  With  little  freedom  of initiative  and  few
resources with which  to guide the program,  rules and  procedures,  not people, become  the
guiding authority  on policy formation  and project  implementation.
2)  The agency resists long-term commitments.  The administration and the Congress
have frequently  changed  the mission of the agency  either  as  a result of a new situation  or
a new political party in power.  With such great uncertainties, three years may be considered
a  long-term  commitment  by  the  agency.36  Short-term  results  are  necessary  for  AID  to
justify  its  existence  before  Congress.  Like  many  other bureaucracies,  survival  goals  (the
means)  often supplant the  ultimate goals  (the  ends).'3 7 For example,  "the present  system
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than work in  the  field.  The  process  may  keep  AID  honest;  it also  keeps  them  from  the
development  process. " ' 38
3)  The agency  is not able to invest  in itself to ensure its own long-term viability.  It
does  not  become  strengthened  as  an  institution  and  is  not  able  to  establish  proper
institutional  relations  with other organizations.  The  agency is burdened  by a multitude of
clients each seeking to influence the agency in their favor.  The agency is given little support
to deal with these competing demands.  Since AID can never succeed in satisfying the many
valid  requests, it often becomes  mired in inertia.39
The consequence of these effects has been the defection of the organization.  It seeks
its narrow  self-interests  without  proper  respect  for  the  interests  and  needs  of  its partner
organizations  including the  universities.  This  then  is the organizational  situation  to which
the  universities must face in  their partnership  with  AID.
U.S.  universities  have  certain  institutional  characteristics  and  values  that  are
remarkably  different  from those of AID.  The description  of these differences  illuminates
the source of some of the conflicts between AID and the universities and explains why their
work  together has continually  failed to achieve  an  effective  collaboration.
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commitments.  Returns to  research  and  institution-building are  slow but substantial.  For
example,  the  land-grant  colleges  significantly  contributed  to  a  five-fold  increase  in
agricultural  productivity  in the  United  States  over  the  last  100 years.'4  However,  most
of those gains occurred  in the latter part of that time period.  Universities  use a methodical
mode  of operation to achieve  long-term  results.  An impermanent  "quick fix"  solution to  a
problem is abhorrent to university faculty.  In his discussion of intellectual leadership, James
MacGregor  Burns  characterized  an intellectual  as,  "in the  first  sense,  a  devotee  of ideas,
knowledge, values ... a person concerned critically with values, purposes, ends that transcend
immediate practical needs."14'
Because of the institutional situation within AID, universities are pressured to achieve
quick,  tangible  results,  in  part  to justify  further  funding.  Universities  would  prefer  to
establish long-term  commitments  to  the program,  but foreign assistance  goals change  too
rapidly for AID to  commit to long-term  funding.
2)  University  faculty members value and are accustomed  to freedom of inquiry and
freedom  to publish the  results  of  their research.  They value  research  sponsors  that  can
provide  them  with  stable  funding  and  a  certain  degree  of  freedom  of  investigation.
Universities have this type of relationship with the USDA and the state experiment stations,
but  not  with  AID.  Unlike  other  government  programs,  such  as  the  National  Science
Foundation,  AID has failed  to understand  the  needs  of the universities.42
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The  challenge  of  the  agency-university  partnership  in  technical  assistance  is  to
mobilize and  coordinate  the various  people,  institutions,  and  resources  for the purpose  of
transferring  or  developing  technology  that  is  helpful to  a host  country.  In  a  contract  for
technical  assistance  program leaders  draw upon  the resources  of two or more universities
in  different  cultures  that  are  under  the  guidance  of vastly  different  governments.  Each
government  and university  has certain resources  and resource needs,  and each has varying
objectives  and expectations for the contract.  The diversity of objectives is due in part to the
vastly different  backgrounds  of the organizations,  and  in part  to  the diverse  leadership  in
the program.  This leadership  comes from  AID Washington,  the U.S.  and host  University
leadership,  the AID  mission,  and  the  U.S.  and  host  country governments.  Each  faculty
member, politician, AID-employee, host country official, and host university faculty member
has certain  incentives  and  certain needs  in carrying  out their particular  responsibilities  in
the program.
By  design,  the  AID-university  technical  assistance  is  carried  out  as  a  partnership.
Projects  are  collaborative  rather  than  competitive.  Institutionally  the  partnerships  are
agency-university,  government-government,  and university-university.  No single  institution
in any of these partnerships  is  the sole leader.  Programmatically,  technical assistance seeks
to  benefit both organizations,  so mutual  goals are  more prominent  than  exclusive  goals.
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each  point  of  interaction.  That  hope,  however,  can  only  be  engendered  by  visionary
leadership.  Leaders must build a certain  culture that will encourage performance.  A host
country,  unlike  a buyer,  does  not  have  the  right to  demand  better  work  (or  work  more
applicable  to their  situation)  when  all  assistance  is perceived  to  be  free.  If the  assisting
agency realizes this condition,  then the self-interested  agency  employee  has little incentive
to do work for  the benefit  of the  aid recipient.  That  employee  is motivated  to satisfy  the
boss -- AID leadership and ultimately Congress and the Administration -- and not to achieve
results for the LDCs.
For university faculty members, the incentive  is to provide assistance and to produce
publishable  research.  By publishing,  a faculty member earns  a higher status, improves the
potential  for achieving  tenure  and a  higher  income,  and  contributes  to  the  knowledge  in
their field.  The faculty member also wants to do well in order to continue to receive grants
from AID and  other agencies.  However,  if the  motivation  is  exclusively  self-interest,  the
faculty member also has little incentive to meet the needs of the host people or the project.
The incentives of U.S. agency personnel is to provide foreign assistance  and to carry
out  the objectives  defined  by  Congress  and the  administration.  AID/W  is  in  a  directive
mode:  it  receives  general  objectives  from  Congress  and  the  Administration  and  relays
specific instructions around the world to AID mission personnel.  Because Congress and the
Administration may vacillate widely about the objectives of the program within the span of
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by the will of Congress  because  it must  appear annually  before Congressional  hearings  to
renew  agency funding.  Consequently,  AID/W's policies  are built  on shifting foundations,
so its directives  to the  AID missions may  have little continuity.
The task of AID missions  is to receive the funding  and direction  from AID/W and
to  design  programs  and  projects  that  match  these  directives  and  fit  within  budgets.
Primarily, their task is to  coordinate  this  program  with the  host country  governments and
institutions.  In  a  sense AID  missions  serve  two  masters:  one  being the  host  country  in
which they live and work, and the other being the country from which they came and which
provides them with funding and resources.  Perhaps because of their proximity to their hosts
and the vacillating directives from AID/W, the AID missions as an institution have become
stronger  in  recent  years  than  AID/W. 1 43 In  fact,  AID  mission  directors  are  routinely
moved  every  four years because  of a  tendency  for  AID  mission  directors  to become  too
closely tied with  the host country.44  This regular rotation adds  to the discontinuity in the
programs.  It creates an incentive structure that rewards new Mission Directors  to discredit
previous work, to begin new programs with a great  deal  of enthusiasm,  and  then to  leave
before  the programs  come  to fruition  and the  problems  begin.'45 Thus,  mission  directors
gain approval for beginning  programs rather  than for completing  old programs.
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and  universities,  and  it  is  an  important  factor  in  understanding  the  history  of  their
relationship.
Although the relationship has achieved some success, that success has been hampered
by the institutional relationship between  the  agency and the universities.  Essentially, each
has  different  interests  in  the  program  and  different  constituents  to  which  they  are
accountable.  This has formed within the two organizations a very different set of values and
norms of behavior.  Although both  are engaged in the same program to achieve  a common
goal of LDC development,  their methods of achieving this goal or modes of operation are
quite  different.  This  creates  an  endemic  problem.  Potentially  both  organizations  can
benefit  through  the  implementation  of  a  favorable  program,  however  coordinating  their
cooperation  is difficult task.
It is  the contention  of this paper that  Congress  in its impatience  to  achieve  quick,
tangible results from the program  has created  an agency  too concerned with procedure  and
unable to build a strong, long-term foundation  for the program.  Similarly, the demands on
faculty members to publish, to be tenured  (which  is difficult to  achieve  during an overseas
project),  and  to  raise  grant  money  have  caused  the  universities  to,  at  times,  put  forth
technical  assistance  that is of  a  rather  poor  quality.  In  essence,  the  constituents  of the
program have so constrained the agency and the universities that building an effective, long-
term partnership has  been exceedingly  difficult.
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nature  of the  difficulty  of AID  and  the  universities  to  establish  an  effective,  long-term
partnership.  It builds upon the present chapter  but uses  a model  to enrich  the discussion.
Game  theory  displays  the  interdependence  of AID  and  the  universities.  To achieve  the
desired results in the LDCs both organizations  must cooperate.  However, the analysis  also
explains  the incongruity of the interests AID  and the universities  have for participating  in
the  program.  Similarly,  their methods  of achieving  a  desired  outcome  are  different  and
often conflict with each  other.  For example,  the universities  value  long-term  contracts  to
achieve  long-term  solutions.  AID  values  short-term  solutions.  These  are  necessary  to
demonstrate  results  to  Congress  that  can justify  continued  appropriations  for the agency.
A game theoretic  analysis  is useful  for  modeling  these  complex  relationships  in  order to
explain them  more clearly.
The conclusion of the game theory is that neither AID nor the universities  have the
interests  of the LDCs  foremost  in their  priorities.  Both organizations  can gain  the  most
from the program  by cooperating  to serve  the  LDCs.  However,  if each organization  acts
purely within its own rational but narrow self-interest, they will defect from the program and
will  ultimately  precipitate  the  demise  of  the  program.  This  is  in  essence  what  is  now
happening to  the program.
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PROGRAM  PROSPECTS:
REBUILDING  THE AGENCY-UNIVERSITY  RELATIONSHIP
Much has been accomplished  during the forty-year collaboration between the agency
and universities.  Difficulties have impaired the success of certain projects, and lessons have
been learned  about  the  process  of providing  technical  assistance.  The  capability of U.S.
universities  to contribute  to  growth  in agricultural  productivity  and in  turn to  the general
economic  growth  of LDCs  remains  strong.  One  need  only  look  at  the  involvement  of
universities  in  the  IARCs  to  be  convinced  that  the  impact  of  the  universities  can  be
impressive, given appropriate institutional arrangements and programmatic goals.  The need
of the program then is to  establish  the proper institutional  arrangements.
1)  A proper  foundation  must be  established.  This requires  an  investment  by all
parties  to the  long-term  viability  of  the program.  Stability  is  needed  to  make  long-term
plans,  a stability  both  in  funding  and in  organizational  structure.  Commitments  must  be
garnered from each organization and a spirit of collaboration must be engendered.  In  1975
Congress sought to establish this foundation with the Title XII amendment.  This legislation
gave  new power to the universities  through BIFAD, provided institutional support  for the
universities,  and added  a new and effective mode of operation.  However, the program was
79not well  insulated  from short-term  political  and  economic demands.  Less  than two years
after signing Title XII, Congress berated the agency for its ineffective work while the foreign
assistance budget failed to grow at its expected rate.  At the same time, the agency was not
given a proper foundation.  Congress voted to accept the proposed  Institute for Science  and
Technology but chose not to fund it.
2)  Once  a  proper foundation  is  in place,  the program must  offer  some reward  to
encourage  effective work  and  to make  participation  in the program  a worthwhile venture
for all organizations.  Under the present system rewards are based on broader interests,  so
the effectiveness  of the work may have little  to do with funding.  It is the leaders who must
demand quality work.  The need for this type of leadership  exists not only in the agency but
also  in  the  universities  as  well.  University  administrators  must  not  send  only  their
expendable  staff  members,  but  must  provide  rewards  to  attract  the  highly  competent
members  to foreign work.  International  work must be  integrated into the campus  life  and
mission, and tenure must not be denied faculty  members who are  involved in the program.
In short, if the partnership is to continue, the effort must be made to continue  to value and
reward U.S. university-AID  technical  assistance work.
3)  The AID-university program  requires a proper goal and a vision for action.  The
famines of the  early 1970s, the need for a domestic constituency  in the early  1950s, and the
spread  of  communism  in the  1960s  each  provided  an  impetus  for  the  program.  Such  an
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momentum.
4)  The  program  needs  to  be subject  to proper accountability.  These evaluations
must be thoughtful and occasional.  They must appraise not only the implementation of the
projects but, also, the ideals and values of the program.  The success  of the Gardner Report
was due to its careful  analysis  and the support of agency leaders.
The integrity of the  institutional arrangements  must match the ultimate goals of the
program.  The  agency  cannot  establish  proper  arrangements  for  long-term  technical
assistance  nor  can  Congress  consistently  fund  them.  Each  organization  is  too  unstable.
Similarly, the universities are not equipped to staff short-term, politically motivated projects.
They  are  not  flexible  enough  and  do  not  value  the  quick-fix  solutions  that  may  be
appropriate for certain  circumstances.
If long-term university technical  assistance  is to continue, then Congress must set up
a foundation system to support technical assistance.  This foundation would free the support
for technical  assistance  programs from short-term political and economic  pressures.  Such
a foundation was  recommended  by  the BIFADEC Task Force  on foreign assistance.
BIFADEC Task Force
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university partnership  and prepare recommendations  for the BIFAD and AID as they plan
the future of University  involvement with AID in foreign  assistance.  Much had changed in
recent years both among the  universities and AID  and in the  new geo-political  setting  for
foreign assistance.  A prime motivation for technical  assistance -- the threat of communism -
- was crumbling from within.  At the same time relations between AID and the universities
were becoming  increasing strained.  Evidence for this  can  be  clearly seen in the  decrease
in University projects  as shown  in Appendix  D.
On  April  19,  1991  the  task  force  headed  by  Dr.  G.  Edward  Schuh  presented  its
findings before the BIFADEC, AID representatives, and a distinguished  array of experts in
the field of technical  assistance.  Also on hand was AID administrator  Ronald Roskens.
The  task force  sought  to  explain  the  need for  AID  to  utilize  U.S.  universities  for
foreign assistance.  First, it described the new world system and the benefits U.S. universities
could bring to  LDCs including education,  rural  agricultural  development,  and a slowdown
in rural to urban migration.  Though these were not new plans, the task force felt they were
still  very  relevant  goals  that  could  fit  well  into  the  democratization  and  privatization
priorities within the agency.
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advantage  in  providing  technical  assistance.  At  the  same  time,  AID's in-house  cadre  of
technical personnel had  significantly  diminished  over time.
The  response  of  AID personnel  revealed  their  indifference  to  the  report.  AID
administrator  Roskens  had  no  comment  on  the  report,  and  many  believe  he  had  little
knowledge  of  its  background.  AID  personnel  more  in  touch  with  the  program  subtly
expressed  the  notion  that  the  reorganized  AID  would  have  little  room  for  university
involvement.  Based  upon  past  performance  they  could  not  be  convinced  that  the  U.S.
universities  ability to supply technical  assistance  gave  the U.S.  a comparative  advantage  in
foreign  aid  over other  countries.  Their response  to  a  radical  plan  by  the  task  force  to
reform  AID  and  retain  its  agricultural  expertise  was  congenial  rather  than  substantive,
causing many to suspect that the bulk of the AID-university program  would simply "wither
on the vine" rather than be  "pruned."
A Look to  the Future
The  continuing  decline  of Title  XII  projects  seems  to  forecast  a  bleak  future  for
university/AID  relations.  It  is  questionable  whether  institution-building  projects  will
continue  in  their  traditional  form  with  the  emergence  of private  sector  initiatives,  the
hesitancy  of  mission  directors  to  use  universities,  and  the  difficulty  in  attracting  quality
university  faculty  for  extended  stays  overseas.  As  the  difference  in  economic  strength
83between developed  countries  and the developing  countries becomes  less distinct, AID will
continue  to change from its origins as a granting organization  to an organization that seeks
mutual cooperation  for the  benefit  of both  the  United  States and the recipient  nations.1 46
The  emerging  chapter  of  the  AID/university  partnership  will  likely  be  the
concentration  on  collaborative  projects.  Institution-building  projects  may  involve  faculty
members in numerous short-term assignments  on specific projects over an extended period
of time.14 7 This arrangement  seems  to be  much  more efficient  than  massive  institution-
building programs,  and has produced  relationships that surprisingly continue over a longer
period  of time than those developed  during  two-year  stays.
The CRSPs are likely  to continue  to be the  dominant mode of partnership between
AID  and  the universities.  A  1986  survey  of mission  directors  and  university  participants
indicated  that  both  groups  held  CRSPs  in  high  regard.'48 CRSPs  are  well-conceived
methods  of engaging  university  expertise  and  strengthening  linkages  among  scientists  of
different  nations,  and  they  have  proven  to  be  effective  in  solving  problems  relating  to
specific commodities.  Moreover,  they attract strong political  support in  Congress.
One of the ironies of the period of institution-building overseas,  is the relative neglect
of U.S.  institutions.1 49 The  strengthening  grants  programs  have  begun  to  address  this
problem and will continue  to  do so in one form or another.  G.  Edward Schuh argued that
84the United States will continue to face increased economic competition from other countries
and will need the strength  of U.S. universities  to maintain  their technological  edge  and to
develop human capital. 150
The  agency  will  continue to use  the private  consulting groups  to perform  technical
assistance and evaluation,  since  these organizations  are more flexible in responding to  the
needs  of  AID  than  are  universities.  If  Republican  administrations  continue  in  power,
private sector  initiatives are  also likely  to continue.
Budgetary  difficulties will  continue  to plague  the institution-building  projects.  The
national  budget deficit  and the  emergence  of new assistance  priorities in Eastern Europe
and perhaps the Middle East will constrain the funding available for the university programs.
More serious is the lack of a political vision to justify technical  assistance programs.
With the new power of the United States in the international  community and the crumbling
of the communist  system, a major impetus  for foreign  assistance  has been removed. 5'
The  present  agency leadership  will  try to  refocus  foreign assistance  toward  capital
transfers  and  the  development  of infrastructure.  This  may continue  to  seriously limit  the
future of university projects in human  capital development.
85Most important,  the sense  of trust  in  and the  mutual commitment  to the  Title  XII
university  projects  has diminished  to the  point  that even with  the  adoption  of new policy
initiatives,  the  agency-university  partnership  may  be  unable  ever  to  be  restored  to  the
effective  program it once was.
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GAME THEORETIC  PERSPECTIVE  OF THE AID-UNIVERSITY  PARTNERSHIP
The AID-university  partnership  in foreign  assistance  is  designed to  meet the  needs
of  its  beneficiaries  --  the  foreign  and  domestic  agricultural  systems,  universities,  and
governments.  An evaluation of the effectiveness  of the program would  study its impact on
these institutions.  Our purpose here is to  study the policy  formation process.  If policy is
determined  by  the  ability of the  program  to meet the  needs of  the  beneficiary,  then  this
study  should  examine  the  evolution  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  program  in  order  to
understand  why  certain  policies  have  been  advocated.  However,  in  the  AID-university
program  it is  the  ability of AID  and the  universities  to  meet the  needs and wishes  of the
constituents that ultimately  influences the formation  of policy.  For example,  to ensure the
continuation of its programs, history would show that AID must concentrate their efforts on
satisfying Congressional  demands more than satisfying the interests  of a LDC government.
A further discussion of the beneficiaries  and constituents of the program is presented below.
The Beneficiaries  of the AID-University  Partnership
Beneficiaries are defined as those people or institutions that receive benefit from the
program but  have  little  authority  to  influence  policy.  AID  and  the  universities  have  the
87same  beneficiaries.  The  LDCs  receive  agricultural  technology  to  increase  agricultural
productivity.  Agricultural institutions have been created and strengthened in the LDCs that
can develop or adapt agricultural technology appropriate to each region.  U.S. farmers have
also benefitted  by the research  advances  of the  CRSP program  such  as the work  done on
the Hessian Fly.
The Constituents of the AID-University  Partnership
Conversely,  AID  and  the  universities  have  diverse  constituents.  Constituents  are
defined here as those people and institutions which both benefit from the program and have
authority to influence policies.  The constituents  for AID include  Congress, which  controls
its funding and authorizes its actions, and the State Department and President to which AID
must  report.  The universities  constituents  include  its  administration  and  the  university
community.
AID  and University  Interests in the  Program
University interests
Universities  value  autonomy,  the  interchange  of  knowledge,  and  long-term
commitments.152  They have  at least  six  reasons for participation  in the  program.1 53
881. Professors who have participated provide students with better teaching.  Examples
can be gleaned from a world-wide  experience  and perspective which'enrich the interest and
breadth  of their knowledge.
2.  The  diversity  of  graduate  students  is  broadened.  The  enrollment  of foreign
graduate  students would  have been fewer had not the universities  been involved  overseas.
3. Participation increases  money for research.
4. The improved international  background  of the faculty benefits both U.S. students
who are  interested  in  international  work  and  international  students  who  find  empathetic
advisers who have lived  overseas.
5. Faculty members  have opportunities  to publish  in  foreign journals on the basis of
their international  experience.
6.  Universities  can  help  alleviate  the  problems  of  hunger  and  famine  among  the
needy people  in the  LDCs.'54
AID  interests
Mapping  out the  specific  institutional  interests of AID  is difficult.  The  mission of
AID  tends  to  change  rapidly  from  one  era  to  another.  AID  has  been  characterized  as
having  no  institutional  memory.  Its  institutional  values,  its  goals  and  its  organizational
structure have changed frequently.  This change  is due in part to changes in its beneficiaries
--  the  countries  it  seeks  to  assist.  More  often,  change  is  initiated  by  its  constituents,
especially when a new administration comes to power.  The influence  of AID's constituents
89is so  strong that Congress and the Administration  explicitly  define the  agency's short-term
interests.  This creates  a situation  in which the  long-term interest of the agency  center  on
satisfying the will of Congress  and  the administration.
The  interests  of Congress  and  the  Administration  in  the  AID-university  program
vacillate, primarily because foreign assistance has a weak domestic constituency.  In general,
they seek a program which can be a flexible, dependable  instrument of foreign policy and
are concerned about finding evidence  showing a favorable return to their investments in the
program.  Thus, the agency is pushed to demand quick, tangible results from AID-university
projects.
The  Decision  Rules:  Cooperation and Defection
Given  these  constituents  and  beneficiaries  and  their  own  interests  and  goals,  the
universities  and AID are  required  to make  numerous  policy  decisions.  Often,  individual
policy  choices  are  determined  by  broad  policy  decision  rules.  Two  policy  rules  --
cooperation  and  defection  --  and the  dynamics  of  the  interaction  between  AID and  the
universities  are defined below.
In cooperation,  a  player's  decision  rule  considers  that one  can  best  achieve  one's
objectives by working in concert with the other organization.  The goals or utility sets of the
90two  organizations  are  unified.  Actions  are  taken  to  maximize  the  utility  of  both
organizations.
In defection, an organization works to achieve its own goals, irrespective of the goals
or  needs  of the  other  organization.  This  does  not  imply  that an organization  terminates
interaction  with the  other  organization.  Rather,  it  means  that  one  organization  works  to
satisfy its own short-term  self-interest and cooperates  with  the other organizations  only to
the extent that the  cooperation  permits the  achievement  of one's  own goals.
The choice  of cooperation does not identify  the game as a zero-sum.  Gains  by one
organization  are  not considered  losses  to  the  other.  Rather,  an  action that  benefits  the
universities  also implicitly benefits AID because it further adds to  the universities  capacity
to  achieve  their  mutual  goals.  This  decision  rule  is  similar  to the justification  for  U.S.
foreign assistance which  is based on "enlightened  self-interest":  gains to the beneficiary  are
also  gains  to the United States.
In defection,  an outcome  is beneficial  only if it contributes to one's narrowly defined
self-interest.  For example,  if AID is defecting, then a research  gain by a university  which,
for example,  did not immediately  contribute  to AID's  interests,  (e.g.  the  ability  to  obtain
funding  from  Congress),  would  not  be  viewed  as  a  gain  to  AID,  but  as  a  loss:  the
universities  could have  spent their time  more effectively  on more pertinent  matters.  The
91next section defines specifically  the character of cooperation and defection for AID and the
universities.
AID cooperation
1)  AID makes long-term  commitment to projects which  allow universities  to have
certainty of funding and the  ability  to plan.155
2)  AID  allows  for  more  University  autonomy,  including  the  ability  for  faculty
research  and  publishing.
3)  AID  commits  itself  to  employ  quality,  technically  competent  staff  who  can
communicate  and plan  with University  faculty.
4)  AID  commits  funds  to the  strengthening  grants  programs  which  improves  the
ability of the  university  to perform  their services for AID.15 6
AID defection
If  AID  defects,  its  support  for  university  programs  extends  only  as  far  as  the
university technical  projects clearly  contribute  to AID's  ability  to prove  its effectiveness  to
Congress.  Congressional  demands  cause AID  to  seek  tangible  evidence  of successes  and
quick returns  to investments.  These demands  lead AID to  engage  in project  rather  than
program evaluation,  and to short-term funding.  AID also tries to control research  so more
tangible  results  can be achieved.  Institutional  support for the program  is limited.
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The characterization  of university  cooperation  is taken from a memorandum sent by
AID/W  to  AID  missions.  The  memorandum  encouraged  the  use  of the  universities  in
foreign assistance, and enumerated four guidelines to measure university commitment.  The
guidelines were chosen by an AID/BIFAD committee  and were based upon the document,
"Basic Principles  for  College  and  University  Involvement  in  International  Development
Activities," adopted  by NASULGC  in  1979.
i.  The universities  must be  committed  to  employing high  quality faculty  in foreign
assistance.  To do so they must increase the incentives for faculty to work with AID
by:
a.  providing  security  to  the  faculty  that grant  money  will  be available  after
they return.
b. Promotions  must recognize  the  benefit  of international  work.  Taking  an
AID  assignment  should  not  limit  possibilities  for  tenure.  (NASULGC
Principle 4)
ii.  Commitment  to quality  and  timely administrative  support  by  the  university  and
departmental administration which  should include committing faculty to learn AID's
financial management  and procurement  policies.  (NASULGC Principles  3,5)
93iii.  Commitment  by  departments  to  effectively  monitor  and  evaluate  university
personnel  overseas.  (NASULGC  Principle  9)
iv.  Commitment  to  give  priority  for  international  development  activities  and  to
integrate  these  activities  into  the  universities  mission  and  offerings.  (NASULGC
Principles  2,7)
University  defection
University defection is characterized by the lack of commitment to fulfilling the above
objectives.  For example,  sending low-quality  faculty  members on  AID projects, or failing
to  integrate international  work into the educational  offerings  on campus.
Outcomes  of the Partnership
The  stated  purpose  of the  program  is  to  achieve  the  development  of  agricultural
productivity in LDCs by building institutions of education, research, and extension that can
generate the human capital and technology necessary for increased  agriculture production.
This  is  not  the  only  relevant  outcome.  Other  outcomes  include,  for  example,  the
development  of goodwill  for  the  United  States,  new  markets  for  U.S.-produced  goods,
knowledge  regarding  institution-building,  and improved  or deteriorated  relations between
AID and  the universities.
94In this "Game" four outcomes are  possible:
AID and the Universities  cooperate  C,C
AID cooperates  and the Universities  defect  C,D
AID defects and the  Universities cooperate  D,C
AID and  the Universities  defect  D,D
The following  chart  shows  the  interaction  between  the  agency  and  universities  in
terms  of  cooperation  and  defection.  It  characterizes  their  relationship  throughout  their
forty-year  history.  Movements  toward  a  more  harmonious  and  productive  relationship
resulted from the creation  of the program,  the administrative  stability  and cooperativeness
of the agency beginning  with the  Bell Era,  and  the revision  of the  program  to form Title
XII.  Movements  toward  retrenchment  and  unproductiveness  resulted  from  the
administrative  restrictiveness  of the  Hollister  Era,  the  search  for  new  forms of technical
assistance following the disappointments  of the decade of development in the 1960s, and the
inability  of the agency  and the universities  to  form  a productive  relationship  following  the
passage  of Title XII.
GAME THEORY  CHART
THE UNIVERSITIES
Cooperation  Defection
- The Early Years:  1950-5.  - Late  Title XII  to
- Growth of IB projects:  Early  Decline:
Cooperation  1962-1968.  1980-85.
- Early Title  XII:  1975-80.
AID
- Hollister Era through  - Late  Decline  in
Formation  of AID:  Agency-Univ.
Defection  1956-61.  Relations:
- Growth  of Multilateral  Aid  1986-present.
and  New Directions:
1969-1974.
95The  Payoffs  of the Partnership
1) AID  and the  Universities cooperate:
If  cooperation  occurs  on  both  sides,  then  assistance  is  carried  out  properly  and
positive  results  will  be  facilitated.  Extra  commitment  is  required  on  both  sides  and
therefore  is  costly.  The  demands  of  constituents  are  not  always  fulfilled;  for  instance,
Congress  may  not  receive  quick,  tangible  results,  and  university  faculty  may  have  fewer
opportunities to publish  their results.  However, the beneficiaries  of the program are better
served.  Moreover,  this  cooperation  positively  influences  future  outcomes  by  creating  a
momentum  of  commitment  to  the  program.  Ostensibly,  as  the  program  becomes  more
successful,  then  each  participant  is benefitted.  This  was  the  situation  during  the  Bell
administration.
2) AID cooperates  and the  Universities  defect:
Many people would  claim that this outcome  occurred  in the  early  1980s.  AID had
incurred expenditures for the program  over and above the results it was receiving from the
universities.  AID's  position  was  inequitable.  Either  it  convinced  the  universities  to
cooperate  or it defected.  In terms of narrowly  defined self-interest,  the universities gained
from the outcome.  They received  monies from the strengthening grants programs  but only
committed lower quality staff members  to the projects.  However, this result was unstable.
During the early  1980s AID  has shown a steady  decrease  in support for the program.
963) AID defects  and the Universities  cooperate:
This situation was  characteristic of the Hollister era.  AID achieved  more from the
program without much expending effort expended.  Based on narrowly defined self-interest,
AID  was  "winning."  The  universities  moved  into  the  inequitable  position  and  again  the
position  is  unstable.  In  this  scenario  the  universities  seek  either  to  convince  AID  to
cooperate  or they will defect.
4) AID  and the Universities  defect:
This may be the  best description  for AID-university  relations during the latter part
of the  1980s.  Neither organization contributed  effectively to the program.  The advantages
of the program to beneficiaries  declined.
This may not be a bad outcome for the constituents, depending upon their goals for
the program.  If the goal  is  to achieve  the stated  purpose  of the  program,  then  AID and
university defection  is  an unfavorable  outcome.  If, however, the  constituent  has  ultimate
goals  for  the  program  other  than  the  stated  purpose,  then  this  outcome  may  not  be
unfavorable.  For  example,  Stassen  was  more  concerned  with  developing  the  domestic
constituency than with the  output of the  program.
If the outcome  for both the  constituents  and beneficiaries  is unfavorable, then  two
options are left:  to improve  the  system whereby AID and  the universities  can cooperate,
or to withdraw  support from the  program.
97Beneficiary  Interests
LDCs want expanded  research on their agricultural production as well as training for
their people.  They need  research  that  is well  suited  to  their people's  needs.  Often,  the
direction of the AID-university  program is driven  primarily by political  forces in both the
host country and the United  States, rather than by people's  needs.  Only when AID and the
universities  see  development  of  the  LDC  as  their  primary  goal  can  the  LDCs  --  the
beneficiaries  --  influence  government  policy.  Ultimately,  interests  of the  beneficiary  have
no authority  and little influence  in AID  decision-making.
Constituent Demands
The  decision  rule  by  which  each  organization  plays  is  strongly  affected  by  its
constituency.  The extent of that effect  depends on the power of both the organization  and
the constituency.  AID in particular is strongly affected by its constituents:  the Congress and
the Administration.
Congress  wields  the  power  to  determine  the  agency's  budget  and  to  authorize  its
priorities.  Initially  they were  reviewed  annually,  but  since  1973  have  been  reviewed  bi-
annually.  Because  the  foreign assistance  program  does not affect domestic interests,  each
98Congressional debate  is a difficult struggle.  Congress generally signals to AID that it seeks
short-term, tangible  returns  to its  foreign assistance  investments.
University  faculty members are often under pressure to publish their findings.  They
want to do research  that will lead  to publishable  results.  This often necessitates long-term
work.
The constituents of the program who tend to focus more upon the fulfillment of their
interests than on achieving the stated purposes of the program often cause universities  and
AID to defect.
The  question  is  how  to  achieve  a  cooperative  relationship  between  AID  and  the
universities.  This  problem  is solved  when  the  program  is  able  to engender  commitment
from  both  organizations.  This  commitment  is  made  stable  by  the  establishment  of
coordination  norms.
For  the  program  to  be  effective  it  must  be  seen  as  a  cooperative  effort  that
maximizes  the relative  skills and experiences  of each  organization  in pursuit of a common
and  mutually beneficial  goal.
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Accomplishments  of the  Program in the  Early Years
A Case  Study of The  Jimma Secondary  School and  the
Alemaya  University  in Ethiopia
The Point Four program  accomplished  much  in its first decade of existence.  It had
undergone  tremendous  changes  in  its  goals  and  its  administration.  One  of  the  more
successful programs  will be  detailed  below.
Prior to 1952 and the technical assistance of Oklahoma State University, Ethiopia had
produced  no  Bachelor  of  Science  graduates.  The  personal  relationship  of  Ethiopian
Emperor Haile Selassie with an early agency administrator  Henry G. Bennett facilitated the
development  of a partnership  to establish  a land-grant type  of agriculture  college.5 7 With
technical assistance from the agency and Oklahoma State University, The Jimma Secondary
School  and the  Alemaya  University  in Ethiopia  established  educational  facilities  for high
school and college-age youth and began doing major research on grains such as teff, a staple
food  in the country.  Their formal partnership  lasted from  1952  to  1968.
100A 1989 study commissioned  by AID explained  the accomplishments  of the university
over the past 37 years. Its graduates  have held positions in government  and in a variety of
international  organizations  throughout  the  world. 1 58 A survey  was  taken  of the  first  80
students at the Jimma School which reported that 50 students graduated from Alemaya with
a  B.S. degree.  Of these students,  26 went on  to receive  master's  degrees  and  16  of these
to receive doctorates  from institutions in the  United  States!'59
Oklahoma State University guided the growth of Alemaya.  Over 16 years,  185 faculty
and staff "assumed  the entire responsibility  for the development and operation of a college
of agriculture.  They  served  as  instructors,  advisers,  and  work  supervisors."160  The  first
four presidents of the College of Agriculture were officers from Oklahoma State University.
This  University  was  free  to  design  their  own  unique  program  to  meet  the  needs  of
Ethiopians, and  they enjoyed a great  deal of autonomy from the  leaders  in  the  agency.'61
The result was  a major agriculture  university  and significant  productivity  increases  among
those  farms  adopting the universities'  new technologies.
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Accomplishments  of the New Directions  and Title XII Period
A Case  Study of the development  of the  Hassan II Institute  of
Agriculture  and Veterinary  Medicine  in Morocco
One of the most successful  AID-university collaborations  is the contract between the
University of Minnesota and the Hassan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine
in Morocco,  begun  in  1969.
A 1987 AID  evaluation reported  that "the Institute has  evolved  in the  space of two
decades  from  12 students  taking their basic science  training from non-Moroccan  faculty  in
temporary  facilities  at Mohammed  V University  to  its  present  status with  approximately
2,300 Moroccan  students and 346 faculty members (of which 85 percent are  Moroccans)  on
its own  campuses in Rabat  and Agadir." 1 62
The  institute  has  become  a  major  research  center  for  agricultural  education  and
research.  Its research  on dryland agriculture  has produced cereals that are resistant  to the
Hessian fly and is now achieving some success  in producing date palms  that are resistent to
a  local  virus  which  infected  10  million  trees.  Students  from  the  institute  are  leaders  in
102government and hold positions in a number of international research  centers.  The institute
is modeled  after  the  U.S.  land-grant  university  concept  but has  formed  a unique  identity,
particularly  in requiring students  to learn  both  crop practices  and veterinary  medicine.
The  major  source  of  funding  and  staffing  for  the  Institute  has  been  the  AID-
university  of Minnesota  collaboration.  Additional  contributions  were  made  by  Germany,
France,  Belgium,  Great  Britain  and  Canada.  The  institute  adopted  educational  systems
from  each  of  these  countries  as  it  developed  a  unique  University.  "This  process  of
investigation,  evaluation, and adoption/rejection  of outside elements has given the Institute
a  feeling  of uniqueness  and  a  high  esprit  de  corps  among  faculty,  administrators,  and
students." 1 63
Several factors were key to the success of AID-university contributions to the Hassan
II Institute.  Of primary importance is the strong, consistent, long-term commitment of both
AID and the University  of Minnesota.  The AID evaluation reported,  "It is remarkable that
substantial assistance  continued  to flow through three successive projects with the Institute
over  15 years,  despite a very negative  first project evaluation and several major differences
of opinion  on  how the  Institute  should  evolve."'64  The  University  of Minnesota  and  its
leaders also exhibited  a strong commitment  to  the program.  Faculty  members were  able
to establish  lasting and productive  terms of service  to  the Institute  because "the University
of Minnesota went to considerable  effort  to ensure  that the terms  and length  of service  of
103their faculty in  Morocco would add  rather than detract from their tenure  prospects  at the
University of Minnesota."'l6
The report noted  three factors under agency  control that  contributed to  the success
of  the  program.' 6 First,  the  agency  gave  a  long-term  commitment  to  the  Institute.
Second, the agency  provided  this funding  in  an incremental  nature,  giving a  modest initial
contract followed by more lucrative contracts as trust was built into the mutual commitments
of the  institute,  the  agency  and  the  University.  Finally, the  agency  managed  the  contract
with  the  University  to  encourage  long-term  and  flexible  commitments  by  all  three
organizations.
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The graph depicts  U.S. University projects  in AID  Bilateral Technical
Assistance  programs  (all development  sectors).
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